The Challenge of Chemical Weapons

Utgoff, Victor A.

doi:10.1007/978-1-349-11759-8

Cited by 8 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd declared in December 1982 that his government fully supported the U.S. position, and the French foreign minister announced in mid-1983 that France had obtained "firm and convincing evidence" of toxin warfare in Southeast Asia. 70 The Australian government, however, openly expressed skepticism about the U.S. government's case. 71 Most countries that investigated the Yellow Rain reports remained silent about their findings because of the Reagan administration's confrontational stance toward Moscow and fears that the controversy would torpedo future progress in U.S.-Soviet arms control.…”

Section: Biochemical Analysesmentioning

confidence: 97%

The “yellow rain” controversy: Lessons for arms control compliance

Tucker¹

2001

The Nonproliferation Review

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Section: Biochemical Analysesmentioning

confidence: 97%

The “yellow rain” controversy: Lessons for arms control compliance

Tucker¹

2001

The Nonproliferation Review

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“…Scenarios for the use of chemical or biological weapons against American conventional forces are outlined inUtgoff, 1990, andBailey, 1991. …”

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confidence: 99%

Mismatched Deterrents: Preventing the Use of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons

Quester

2000

Int Studies Perspectives

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The basic logic of graduated deterrence worked fairly well against the Soviet Union, as each level of aggression was to be deterred by a matching response. But this logic has now been undermined vis-à-vis future rogue state chemical and biological attacks by the spread of dual-use technologies that can be diverted to weapons, and by decisions of the United States and other democracies to forego possession of chemical or biological weapons. This article identifies some of the serious difficulties of alternative approaches to deterring chemical or biological attacks, ranging from nuclear escalation to a reliance on supposed American advantages in conventional weapons. Lumping chemical and biological weapons together with nuclear weapons into a new category of "weapons of mass destruction" is a very imperfect solution.

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