The cg -position value for games on fuzzy communication structures

Fernández, Julio R.; Gallego, Inés; Jiménez-Losada, Andrés; Ordóñez, Manuel

doi:10.1016/j.fss.2017.04.014

Cited by 7 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…(8). Therefore, the intuitionistic fuzzy coalition A-T solution ofṽ ∈G 3 are AT (ṽ) = ( [2,10], [8,19], [11,13]). Especially, when the intuitionistic fuzzy sets of input resources areÃ 1 =< 1; 0.1, 0.9 >,Ã 2 =< 2; 0.3, 0.7 >, A 3 =< 3; 0.5, 0.5 >,Ã 1 =< 1; 0.1, 0.5 >, the intuitionistic fuzzy coalitions degenerate to normal fuzzy coalitions due to µS (i) + υS (i) = 1.…”

Section: Profit Allocation Strategy Decision Of Restricted Cooperamentioning

confidence: 99%

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Profit Allocations for Restricted Coalition With Hesitation Degrees in Cooperative Game Theory

Yang

2020

IEEE Access

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Profit allocation plays an important role in the decision-making field. In this paper, we study an allocation method on restricted coalition cooperation with intuitionistic fuzzy coalitions, in which the partners have some hesitation degree and different risk preferences when they participate in a limited communication structure game. In order to sufficiently analyze the profit allocation strategy, an average tree solution (A-T solution) with Choquet integrals and hesitation degrees is studied. In particular, a simple solving method for the AT solution is proposed by proving that the characteristic functions of the cooperative game satisfy the monotonicity condition. Using this method, the upper and lower bounds of the AT solution can be calculated directly from the upper and lower bounds of the interval characteristic functions. This method avoids the subtraction of interval numbers. Furthermore, the properties of the AT solution according to an axiomatic system are proved in this paper. Finally, the applicability and superiority of the proposed approach are demonstrated through comparison with other methods.

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Section: Profit Allocation Strategy Decision Of Restricted Cooperamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…the super-additivity belongs to the core [8]. Later, the A-T solution for an acyclic restricted coalition cooperative game with communication structure was generalized [9], [10]. And a version of the A-T solution appropriate for a game based on an acyclic graph was studied [11].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Profit Allocations for Restricted Coalition With Hesitation Degrees in Cooperative Game Theory

Yang

2020

IEEE Access

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“…In this case, it is unsuitable to express cooperation profits with real numbers. To address this issue, much research work used fuzzy numbers to estimate the cooperation profits and established the so-called fuzzy cooperative games [16][17][18][19][20]. Actually, there are two cases of cooperative games with fuzzy payoffs: one is all the players are full take part in cooperative, the coalitions are crisp but the payoffs are determined with fuzzy numbers [21][22][23].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Programming models-based method for deriving profits allocation scheme with interval-valued cooperative games

Niu²,

Ye³

et al. 2023

IJCAI

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Owing to the fact that the payoff of grand coalition is limited to players' allocation, what is more, other players will not satisfy with the allocation scheme if one of the possible coalitions allocate too much. Based on this fact, it is better to pursuit the allocation scheme for all players in coalition are as close to the coalition's payoff as possible. In contrast, if the allocation scheme for all players in coalition is far from the coalition's payoff, this will lead to the instability of the coalition. To address this issue, several linear programming models are constructed for taking into account the players' compromise limit constraints. First, the profits allocation model with undominated nonnegative excess vector is extended to interval-valued fuzzy environments. Second, several linear programming models are constructed respectively considering without and with coalitions' compromise limit constraints. Third, an illustrative example in conjunction with comparative analyses is employed to demonstrate the validity and applicability of the proposed models. Finally, the relationship of the models is discussed between without and with coalitions' compromise limit constraints.Povzetek: Razvitih je več modelov z metodami linearnega programiranja za določanje uspešnih skupin predvsem glede časovne opredelitve.

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“…In this case, it is unsuitable to express cooperation profits with real numbers. To address this issue, much research work uses fuzzy numbers to estimate the cooperation profits and establishes the so-called fuzzy cooperative games [16][17][18][19][20]. Actually, there are two cases of cooperative games with fuzzy payoffs: one is all the players' resources are full take part in cooperative, the coalitions are crisp but the payoffs are determined with fuzzy numbers [21][22][23].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deriving profits allocation scheme in view of the players’ risk attitudes with interval-valued cooperative games

Niu

Chen

et al. 2022

Preprint

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Interval-valued cooperative games use interval numbers to represent the returns of coalition. It indicatives that the uncertain of the returns are emerge from the coalition. This leads to the uncertainty of the players’ returns who participating in the cooperation. The players with different risk preferences will have different attitudes towards the uncertainty of coalition returns. To address this issue, several allocation models are constructed by taking into account players’ risk attitudes. There are four types of players’ risk preference are concerned, namely, risk neutral, risk pursuit, risk aversion and risk mixed. First, to remove fuzziness of interval relationships presented in interval-valued core, the comparison method of interval numbers is utilized. Second, the allocation models are developed by taking into account decision makers’ risk attitudes and the absolute difference of two interval numbers, there are two types are concerned, that is, the allocation models respectively considering the coalition with the same satisfaction level of absolute difference and different satisfaction level of absolute difference. Third, an illustrative example is employed to demonstrate the validity and applicability of the proposed models. Finally, comparison of distribution schemes obtained in this study and obtained from other several methods are conducted.

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The cg -position value for games on fuzzy communication structures

Cited by 7 publications

References 26 publications

Profit Allocations for Restricted Coalition With Hesitation Degrees in Cooperative Game Theory

Profit Allocations for Restricted Coalition With Hesitation Degrees in Cooperative Game Theory

Programming models-based method for deriving profits allocation scheme with interval-valued cooperative games

Deriving profits allocation scheme in view of the players’ risk attitudes with interval-valued cooperative games

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