The CEO's Representation of Demands and the Corporation's Response to External Pressures: Do Politically Affiliated Firms Donate More?

Zhang, Zhe

doi:10.1111/j.1740-8784.2012.00297.x

Cited by 39 publications

(44 citation statements)

References 77 publications

(142 reference statements)

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“…Second, cash holdings have strategic benefits that can be used by firms to engage in philanthropic giving for forging social exchanges with officials. For example, corporate social responsibility received considerable attention after the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008 (Jia and Zhang, ). However, our study finds that, beginning in 2001, philanthropic giving has helped privately owned firms survive during an even longer period.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In accordance with Brown et al (), Jia and Zhang (), and Wang and Qian (), we measure philanthropic giving at firm i headquartered in city j during year t . Giving is the log‐transformed ratio of philanthropic giving to total assets ( ratio of giving to assets ×100+1).…”

Section: Data and Research Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Philanthropic giving is a traditional way to forge ties with officials for accomplishing corporate political goals. Many firms recognize the influence of philanthropic giving on government decision making as well (Jia and Zhang, ; Marquis and Qian, ; Wang and Qian, ). Consequently, exchanges between local firms and political officials through corporate giving have attracted considerable attention from scholars.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Indirect Reciprocity and Corporate Philanthropic Giving: How Visiting Officials Influence Investment in Privately Owned Chinese Firms

Xiang

Zhang

2018

J Management Studies

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This study examines how privately owned firms that are listed on Chinese stock exchanges and often surrounded by Buddhist or Taoist temples use money to bind themselves to officials who can mitigate their underinvestment problems. Philanthropic giving is a traditional way of achieving this task. Based on social‐exchange theory, we consider the potential for indirect reciprocity, in which visiting officials do favours for local businesses that do favours for other social actors. We analyse whether China’s Buddhist and Taoist cultures influence how philanthropic giving induces visiting officials to do favors. We also examine temple locations and the behaviours of privately owned firms listed on Chinese stock exchanges from 2001 to 2012 in an empirical study that provides strong support for our arguments. Results show that philanthropic giving initiates and amplifies indirect reciprocity between visiting officials and local businesses, thereby increasing corporate investment. The magnitudes of these effects depend on the magnitude of religious norms. Our study thus illuminates the influence of visiting officials on corporate investment.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Data and Research Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Indirect Reciprocity and Corporate Philanthropic Giving: How Visiting Officials Influence Investment in Privately Owned Chinese Firms

Xiang

Zhang

2018

J Management Studies

Self Cite

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“…For example, research has shown that firms with strong affiliation with politicians tend to donate more (Jia & Zhang, 2013). This suggests that government-encouraged donation may be a creative form of bribery.…”

Section: Limitations and Future Research Directionsmentioning

confidence: 95%

Are Manager-controlled Firms More Likely to Bribe than Shareholder-controlled Firms: A Cross-cultural Analysis

2015

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To examine the bribing behavior of firms, we developed a cross-level moderation model using agency theory at the firm level and anomie theory at the societal level to investigate the relationship between manager control of firms and firm bribery activity. The results of this cross-cultural analysis using a sample of 1,799 firms from 38 nations showed that at the firm level, manager-controlled firms (MCFs) have a higher propensity to bribe than shareholder-controlled firms. At the country level, bribery is higher in MCFs (relative to shareholder-controlled firms) in societies with a low level of institutional collectivism, a high level of uncertainty avoidance, economic change, and income inequality. Contrary to the hypothesis, the relationship between bribery and manager control is stronger rather than weaker in societies with press freedom. Implications for future research and practices are discussed.

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“…Further, firms may give due to political pressure when the CEO has strong government affiliation (Jia & Zhang, 2013) regardless of the CEO's or chairperson's motive. First, we examine political appointment as a means of fulfilling pro-social motives.…”

Section: Limitations and Future Research Directionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Confucian Social Model of Political Appointments among Chinese Private-Firm Entrepreneurs

Liang

2015

AMJ

142

107

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In China, many successful private-firm entrepreneurs hold representational appointments in political councils such as the People's Congress (PC) or People's Political Consultative Conference (PPCC). By considering Western theories of life/career development and Confucian doctrines of personal development, we seek to understand the complex motivations for joining political councils by successful entrepreneurs. We propose a Confucian social model of role transition to explain political appointment pursuit and attainment in China. We hypothesize that the pro-self and pro-social motives for seeking political connections will, respectively, attenuate or strengthen the relationship between private-firm entrepreneurs' business success and political appointment seeking intention and attainment. We conducted a cross-sectional survey of 166 private-firm CEOs/chairpersons and a longitudinal archival study of 1323 Chinese publicly listed private firms between 2006 and 2012. The findings support our hypotheses on the moderating effect of pro-self motive and pro-social motive. The study offers insights on how Confucian cultural values may explain the dynamic between business success and political appointments of private entrepreneurs in China.

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The CEO's Representation of Demands and the Corporation's Response to External Pressures: Do Politically Affiliated Firms Donate More?

Cited by 39 publications

References 77 publications

Indirect Reciprocity and Corporate Philanthropic Giving: How Visiting Officials Influence Investment in Privately Owned Chinese Firms

Indirect Reciprocity and Corporate Philanthropic Giving: How Visiting Officials Influence Investment in Privately Owned Chinese Firms

Are Manager-controlled Firms More Likely to Bribe than Shareholder-controlled Firms: A Cross-cultural Analysis

A Confucian Social Model of Political Appointments among Chinese Private-Firm Entrepreneurs

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