The Causal Effect of Market Priming on Trust: An Experimental Investigation Using Randomized Control

Al‐Ubaydli, Omar; Houser, Daniel; Nye, John V. C.; Paganelli, Maria Pia; Pan, Xiaofei

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055968

Cited by 48 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 36 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Herz and Taubinsky (2013) show that exposure to market pressure serves as an anchor and lowers the minimum amount participants are willing to accept in an ultimatum game but not the amount they offer to others. Al-Ubaydli et al (2013), on the other hand, find that priming participants using phrases related to markets and trade increases trust in a trust game through a positive effect on the beliefs about others' trustworthiness compared to a control group.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 96%

The Flipside of Comparative Payment Schemes

Buser

Dreber

2016

Management Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Comparative payment schemes and tournament-style promotion mechanisms are pervasive in the workplace. We test experimentally whether they have a negative impact on people’s willingness to cooperate. Participants first perform in a simple task and then participate in a public goods game. The payment scheme for the task varies across treatment groups. Compared with a piece-rate scheme, individuals in a winner-takes-all competition are significantly less cooperative in the public goods game. A lottery treatment, where the winner is decided by luck, has the same effect. In a competition treatment with feedback, winners cooperate as little as participants in the other treatments, whereas losers cooperate even less. All three treatments lead to substantial losses in the realised social surplus from the public good while having no significant impact on performance. In a complementary experiment, we aim to shed light on the psychological mechanisms behind our results. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2257 . This paper was accepted by Teck-Hua Ho, behavioral economics.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 96%

The Flipside of Comparative Payment Schemes

Buser

Dreber

2016

Management Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…But humans do tend to trust, and to invest, despite its suboptimality [11]. Attempts to diagnose this propensity for blind trust have spanned both empirical [1,13,19,23,27,29,44,45,57] and theoretical [16,33,50] disciplines.…”

Section: Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Each investor plays x = 500 rounds of the game, and after x rounds, a new generation of investors and trustees are selected. 1 If an investor's trust (t) or a trustee's return rate (r ) performs better compared to others, that agent and its attribute have a higher likelihood of appearing in the next generation.…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Expectations of Fairness and Trust Co-Evolve in Environments of Partial Information

Rauwolf¹,

Bryson²

2017

Dyn Games Appl

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

When playing one-shot economic games, individuals often blindly trust others, accepting partnerships without any information regarding the trustworthiness of their partner. Consequently, they risk deleterious pacts. Oddly, when individuals do have information about another, they reject partnerships that are not fair, despite the fact that such offers are profitable-individuals costly punish. Why would one reject profitable partnerships on the one hand, but risk unknown offers on the other? Significant research has gone into explaining the contexts where blind trust or costly punishment provides an evolutionary advantage; however, both behaviours are rarely considered in tandem. Here we demonstrate that both behaviours can simultaneously be revenue maximizing. Further, given the plausible condition of partially obscured information and partner choice, trust mediates the generation of costly punishment. This result is important because it demonstrates that the evolutionary viability of trust, fairness, and costly punishment may be linked. The adaptive nature of fairness expectations can best be explained in concert with trust.

show abstract

“…Because trustors will anticipate that context frames have no impact on the trustee's FOBs and hence her choice, the trustor chooses independently of the context frame. Yet context framing effects have nevertheless been observed in trust games (e.g., Al-Ubaydli, Houser, Nye, Paganelli, & Pan, 2013;Cronk & Wasielewski, 2008).…”

Section: Coordination Device Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Another frame, another game? Explaining framing effects in economic games

Gerlach¹,

Jaeger²

2016

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Small changes in the framing of games (i.e., the way in which the game situation is described to participants) can have large effects on players' choices. For example, referring to a prisoner's dilemma game as the "Community Game" as opposed to the "Wall Street Game" can double the cooperation rate (Liberman, Samuels, & Ross, 2004). Framing effects are an empirically well-studied phenomenon. However, a coherent theoretical explanation of the observed effects is still lacking. We distinguish between two types of framings - valence framing and context framing - and provide an overview of three general classes of theories that may account for the observed changes in behaviour.

show abstract

The Causal Effect of Market Priming on Trust: An Experimental Investigation Using Randomized Control

Cited by 48 publications

References 36 publications

The Flipside of Comparative Payment Schemes

The Flipside of Comparative Payment Schemes

Expectations of Fairness and Trust Co-Evolve in Environments of Partial Information

Another frame, another game? Explaining framing effects in economic games

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About