The case for motivated reasoning.

Kunda, Ziva

doi:10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.480

Cited by 6,738 publications

(5,859 citation statements)

References 115 publications

Supporting

241

Mentioning

5,297

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…This perspective is in line with classic theory and research on motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990). Kunda eloquently argued that the mechanism underlying motivated reasoning is the differential recruitment of cognitive processes, representations and beliefs.…”

Section: List Of Figuressupporting

confidence: 81%

Changing theories of change: Strategic shifting in implicit theory endorsement.

Leith¹,

Ward²,

Giacomin³

et al. 2014

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

People differ in their implicit theories about the malleability of characteristics such as intelligence and personality. These relatively chronic theories can be experimentally altered, and can be affected by parent or teacher feedback. Little is known about whether people might selectively shift their implicit beliefs in response to salient situational goals. We predicted that, when motivated to reach a desired conclusion, people might subtly shift their implicit theories of change and stability to garner supporting evidence for their desired position. Any motivated context in which a particular lay theory would help people to reach a preferred directional conclusion could elicit shifts in theory endorsement. We examine a variety of motivated situational contexts across 7 studies, finding that people’s theories of change shifted in line with goals to protect self and liked others and to cast aspersions on disliked others. Studies 1–3 demonstrate how people regulate their implicit theories to manage self-view by more strongly endorsing an incremental theory after threatening performance feedback or memories of failure. Studies 4–6 revealed that people regulate the implicit theories they hold about favored and reviled political candidates, endorsing an incremental theory to forgive preferred candidates for past gaffes but leaning toward an entity theory to ensure past failings “stick” to opponents. Finally, in Study 7, people who were most threatened by a previously convicted child sex offender (i.e., parents reading about the offender moving to their neighborhood) gravitated most to the entity view that others do not change. Although chronic implicit theories are undoubtedly meaningful, this research reveals a previously unexplored source of fluidity by highlighting the active role people play in managing their implicit theories in response to goals.

show abstract

Section: List Of Figuressupporting

confidence: 81%

Changing theories of change: Strategic shifting in implicit theory endorsement.

Leith¹,

Ward²,

Giacomin³

et al. 2014

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Nisbett and Wilson (1977) demonstrated such post-hoc reasoning for causal explanations. Kuhn (1991), Kunda (1990), and Perkins, Farady, and Bushey (1991) found that everyday reasoning is heavily marred by the biased search only for reasons that support one's already-stated hypothesis.…”

Section: The Links In the Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.

Haidt

2001

Psychological Review

5,728

2,499

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. Four reasons are given for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post-hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it de-emphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals, emphasizing instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent than rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as anthropology and primatology.

show abstract

“…Additionally, these effects are often found to be stronger when an individual's self-image is threatened (Beauregard and Dunning, 1998;Brown and Gallagher, 1992) and weaker when an individual's self-image is affirmed (Steele, 1988;Tesser and Cornell, 1991), suggesting that a motivation to maintain one's self-image is a driving force in these effects. These positive illusions (Greenwald, 1980;Taylor and Brown, 1988) and motivated reasoning processes (Kunda, 1990) seem to conflict with the general view that cognitive processes are designed to represent the world accurately; when it comes to ourselves, we appear instead to want to view ourselves positively, although not always (Swann et al, 1989). The extent to which these motivated reasoning processes overlap with the effect of mood and affect on judgment (Ashby et al, 1999;Forgas, 1995;Gray, 1999) is still unclear but this may be a starting point for cognitive neuroscience investigations.…”

Section: Motivated Reasoningmentioning

confidence: 99%

Principles, processes, and puzzles of social cognition: An introduction for the special issue on social cognitive neuroscience

Lieberman

2005

NeuroImage

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article introduces the special issue of NeuroImage focused on social cognitive neuroscience. Social psychology has a rich history of making sense of the often paradoxical aspects of social cognition and the social world. This article reviews the principles, processes, and puzzles of social cognition and behavior that have been examined by social psychologists for decades. Five principles of social cognition and behavior are reviewed including: (1) the power of the situation over behavior, (2) blindness for situational influences, (3) social perception and self-perception are constructive processes, (4) blindness for the constructed nature of social and self-perception, and (5) self-processes are social. Four processes of social cognition are reviewed including: (1) cognitive architecture; (2) automaticity and control; (3) motivated reasoning; and (4) accessibility, frames, and expectations. Finally, five areas of social cognition that contain enduring puzzles are described including (1) the self, (2) attitudes, (3) reflective social cognition, (4) automatic social cognition, and (5) social motives. In several of the areas of study reviewed, cognitive neuroscience is well positioned to make important contributions to these research traditions either by allowing for new tests of hypotheses or by allowing for unobtrusive measurement of social cognitive processes. D

show abstract

The case for motivated reasoning.

Cited by 6,738 publications

References 115 publications

Changing theories of change: Strategic shifting in implicit theory endorsement.

Changing theories of change: Strategic shifting in implicit theory endorsement.

The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.

Principles, processes, and puzzles of social cognition: An introduction for the special issue on social cognitive neuroscience

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About