The Case for Joint Trusteeship of Pension Plans

Cook, Rosalind

doi:10.1111/j.1743-4580.2002.00026.x

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In collectively bargained single‐employer plans, the firm chooses the pension manager and the union is not guaranteed any control over the pension assets, though a small number of unions have used the collective bargaining process to negotiate for joint‐trusteeship between union and management (Cook ). Our research was unable to find information on how many unions have negotiated joint‐trusteeship for single‐employer plans.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Do Unions Do to Pension Performance?

Even

Macpherson

2014

Economic Inquiry

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu This study argues that the promotion of union goals could have positive, negative, or neutral effects on risk adjusted return performance. Moreover, the union's ability and incentive to use pension assets to promote union goals will vary with the design of the pension. Using panel data on over 36,000 pension plans drawn from IRS Form 5500 filings, we empirically estimate the effects of unions on risk adjusted returns and find that the union effect on performance varies in ways that are consistent with our priors. In particular, unions have the largest negative effect among multi-employer defined contribution plans and the negative effect of unions can be eliminated by a switch to participant direction. Also, we find that unions improve performance for single employer defined contribution plans. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E S

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Do Unions Do to Pension Performance?

Even

Macpherson

2014

Economic Inquiry

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Participation in Corporate Governance

McGaughey

2014

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Over the last thirty years there has been a remarkable functional convergence in the way companies are run. Behind directors, asset managers and banks usually participate the most in setting the ultimate direction of corporations, as they have assumed the role of stewardship over shareholder voting rights. At the same time, an increasing number of people's livelihoods and old age now depend on the stock market, but these ultimate contributors to equity have barely any voice. Why has there been such a separation of contribution and participation?Two positive theses explain this convergence in corporate governance, one political, one economic. The first positive thesis is that laws which guarantee participation rights in investment chains (either for shareholders against directors, or for the ultimate contributors against institutional shareholders) were driven by a progressive democratic movement, but very incompletely compared to its social ideals. The second positive thesis is that when there have been no specific rights in law, the relative bargaining power of different groups determined the patterns of participation, whether the outcomes were reasonable or entirely arbitrary. In practice, the separation has grown between those who contribute to equity capital and those who participate in governance. These theses are preferable to existing narratives in political literature, and law and economics, which entail predictions of different forms of rational interest-driven institutional evolution. On the contrary, participation in corporate governance is largely unprincipled. The evidence is found in the historical development of participation rights in the UK, Germany and the US.Does the separation of contribution and participation matter? One normative thesis is derived from the historical evidence. It proposes that the separation of contribution and participation is a pressing concern, precisely because participation in corporate governance, as it stands, manifests no coherent principles. Asset managers and banks have gathered shareholder voting rights through no better reason than their peculiar market position as investment intermediaries. They have significant conflicts of interest when they exercise voting rights with other people's money. They are able to use votes like any other selfperpetuating interest group would, because they are not effectively accountable to their natural beneficiaries: the ultimate investors. To ensure that the successes of modern corporate law are not unravelled, corporate governance should protect the principle of a symmetry between contribution and participation. This will mean that in the future, corporate governance becomes more economically efficient, sustainable, and just.

show abstract

The Case for Joint Trusteeship of Pension Plans

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

What Do Unions Do to Pension Performance?

What Do Unions Do to Pension Performance?

Participation in Corporate Governance

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About