1997
DOI: 10.3386/w5993
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The Case for a Two-Part Instrument: Presumptive Tax and Environmental Subsidy

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Cited by 37 publications
(49 citation statements)
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“…Policies to reduce GHG emissions from livestock Tax-subsidy combinations In cases (such as GHG emissions from livestock production) where it is administratively costly to monitor emissions, it is possible to increase the efficiency of an abatement technology subsidy by combining it with an output tax (Fullerton, 1997;Fullerton and Wolverton, 1999;Walls and Palmer, 2001). As discussed above, an abatement technology subsidy creates an incentive for producers to switch to a less-polluting technology, but it also decreases firms' average costs of production and therefore decreases the equilibrium break-even price.…”
Section: Gerber Key Portet and Steinfeldmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Policies to reduce GHG emissions from livestock Tax-subsidy combinations In cases (such as GHG emissions from livestock production) where it is administratively costly to monitor emissions, it is possible to increase the efficiency of an abatement technology subsidy by combining it with an output tax (Fullerton, 1997;Fullerton and Wolverton, 1999;Walls and Palmer, 2001). As discussed above, an abatement technology subsidy creates an incentive for producers to switch to a less-polluting technology, but it also decreases firms' average costs of production and therefore decreases the equilibrium break-even price.…”
Section: Gerber Key Portet and Steinfeldmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The tax/subsidy combination needed here is an example of the "two-part instruments" proposed by Fullerton and Wolverton (1999) to replace pollution taxes that pose particular monitoring or enforcement problems.…”
Section: An Assessment Of Hazardous Waste Taxesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Thus the real net wage and labor supply are unchanged. In fact, as shown in Fullerton and Wolverton (1996), each environmental tax has an equivalent two-part instrument. Any tax on waste may be difficult to enforce, and it can always be replaced by an equivalent combination of a presumptive tax on production plus an environmental subsidy.…”
Section: An Environmental Subsidymentioning
confidence: 99%