The Case for a Populist Banker

Velasco, Andrés; Guzzo, Vincenzo

doi:10.3386/w6802

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…(3) CBI may be endogenous (Posen, 1993, Eijffinger, 1997; (4) the central bank may share government's (and markets') short time horizon; and (5) shallow financial markets may incapacitate monetary policy. Furthermore, it can be shown that a central banker who has no concern for inflation may maximize social welfare, if wage setting is highly concentrated (Velasco and Guzzo, 1998).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Monetary and Fiscal Coordination in Small Open Economies

Worrell¹,

Dept²

2000

SSRN Journal

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Monetary and Fiscal Coordination in Small Open Economies

Worrell¹,

Dept²

2000

SSRN Journal

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“…Since the contributions by Velasco and Guzzo [1999] and Lippi [2000], it is well-known that monetary institutions, such as central bank's conservativeness, may permanently a¤ect the trade-o¤ between in ‡ation and unemployment through their e¤ects on strategic wage setting. The results in this paper may be read as extending this insight to a particular monetary policy regime shift, by showing that the macroeconomic consequences of establishing a monetary union may depend in a non-linear way on central banking institutions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inflationary performance in a monetary union with large wage setters

Cavallari¹

2004

Monetary Policy, Fiscal Policies and Labour Markets

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. In ‡ationary performance in a monetary union with large wage setters ¤ Lilia Cavallari University of Rome "La Sapienza" Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractBuilding on a micro-founded model of a two region-world economy in the tradition of the new open economy literature, this paper analyses the strategic interaction of large wage-setters and the central bank when switching from a regime of uncoordinated national monetary policies to a monetary union. The establishment of a monetary union is shown to favour wage restraint, provided the uni…ed central bank is not too conservative. Wage discipline may reduce equilibrium in ‡ation in a monetary union relative to the one under uncoordinated national monetary policies when wage setting is centralised across member countries.JEL codes:E5, F4

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Wages and Wage-Bargaining Institutions in the EMU — A Survey of the Issues

Calmfors

2003

Institutional Conflicts and Complementarities

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A perceived need to increase nominal wage flexibility as a substitute for domestic monetary policy and a tendency to less wage moderation are likely to promote bargaining coordination and social pacts in the EMU. But such coordination is not likely to be sustainable in the long run, as it conflicts with other forces working in the direction of decentralization and deunionisation. Although monetary unification will strengthen the incentives for higher-level transnational coordination of wage bargaining, such a development is improbable because of the coordination costs involved. If transnational coordination develops, it is most likely to occur within multinational firms.

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The Case for a Populist Banker

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Monetary and Fiscal Coordination in Small Open Economies

Monetary and Fiscal Coordination in Small Open Economies

Inflationary performance in a monetary union with large wage setters

Wages and Wage-Bargaining Institutions in the EMU — A Survey of the Issues

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