The Calculus of Voting in Compulsory Voting Systems

Abstract

Compulsory voting laws have consistently been demonstrated to boost electoral participation. Despite the widespread presence of compulsory voting and the significant impact these laws appear to have on voting behavior, surprisingly little effort has been devoted to analyzing how mandatory voting alters the decisionmaking calculus of individual voters in these systems. Moreover, studies that investigate the influence of compulsory voting laws on electoral participation generally treat these policies monolithically, with scant attention to the nuances that differentiate mandatory voting laws across systems and to their consequences for voting rates. Analyses that explicitly and empirically examine the effects of penalties and enforcement are surprisingly rare. This study aims to fill that void by adapting rational choice models of participation in elections for compulsory voting systems. I find that the level of penalties countries impose for non-compliance and the degree of penalty enforcement impact turnout rates. Voters in mandatory voting systems abstain least when both the penalties and the likelihood of enforcement are high, and abstain most when both meaningless.

How Compelling is Compulsory Voting? A Multilevel Analysis of Turnout

“…This echoes previous findings that overall turnout levels are higher in compulsory systems (Norris 2004;Blais 2006). Panagopoulos (2008) shows that the level of sanctions and the likelihood of enforcement affect voter behavior in the aggregate. Nevertheless, it is apparent from Model 4 that while the directionality of the coefficients on the sanctions and enforcement variables is positive, the variables do not attain statistical significance.…”

“…In addition, the likelihood of enforcement and the strictness of the penalty for abstention vary across countries that employ compulsory rules, and Panagopoulos (2008) finds that such variation affects the overall impact of the compulsory rule. Panagopoulos demonstrates that, in the aggregate, penalties and enforcement affect turnout in an interactive manner; turnout levels are highest when penalties are high and enforcement is likely.…”

Trust in elections, vote buying, and turnout in Latin America

“…This relationship is strongly supported in the literature, and many works estimate the impact between ten and fifteen points (Blais and Aarts, 2006;Fornos et al, 2004;Jackman, 1987). However, other studies argue that compulsory voting is only meaningful when it is enforced (Panagopoulos, 2008). Voting is mandatory in many Latin American countries, but the enforcement level varies significantly across countries (Fornos et al, 2004).…”

Entity/Event-Level Sentiment Detection and Inference

“…María has never ever voted... In contrast to the two dominant voting behavior approaches that stress on the individual characteristics that make voters more likely to cast their votes (Downs 1957, Finkel 1985, Rosenstone 1993, Brady et al 1995, Bratton 1999, Gerber et al 2008, or those that emphasize on the institutional features that influence citizens' voting decisions (Powell 1986, Pérez-Liñán 2001, Fornos et al 2004, Panagopoulos 2008, Steiner 2010, some scholars argue that turnout is better explained by persistence from one election to the next, which is habitual voting 4 . The logic underlying this assumption is that the reasons why voters cast their vote cannot be fully elucidated by rational factors (Downs 1957) or because voters respond to electoral stimulus (campaign, mobilization or canvassing effects) but instead because voting becomes habitual through repetition.…”