The Cabinet: A Viable Definition and its Composition in View of a Comparative Analysis

Barbieri, Cristina; Vercesi, Michelangelo

doi:10.1017/gov.2013.1

Cited by 12 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 35 publications

(37 reference statements)

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“…The main distinction is between internal arenas (where only government members participate), mixed arenas (both internal and external actors), and external arenas (only nongovernment members). Internal actors are both senior and junior ministers (together with their personal advisers); civil servants are instead external (Barbieri and Vercesi ). However, all the arenas considered are internal with respect to the coalition and therefore arenas, such as parliamentary arenas—where members of the opposition attend—are excluded.…”

Section: The Process Of Inter‐party Conflict Management: Who Participmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coalition Politics and Inter‐Party Conflict Management: A Theoretical Framework

Vercesi

2016

Politics & Policy

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Inter-party conflict management is a typical coalitional problem in parliamentary governments. To study how and why conflicts in coalitions emerge and how parties cope with them can enhance our knowledge of coalition governance. Here, I propose a framework for comparative studies on the topic. The framework is based on the conception of coalition politics as politics of exchange. It looks at interparty interactions, but also accounts for the impact of intra-party politics. Moreover, I provide a classification of inter-party conflicts in coalitions and point out when they are more likely. The process of conflict management is operationalized with two proxies-actors, and arenas-and a taxonomy of conflict terminations is presented. The viability of the framework is tested both by mapping coalition governments according to their modes of managing internal conflicts and, after deriving research hypotheses, through empirical inquiries of conflict management in diverse coalitions.

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Section: The Process Of Inter‐party Conflict Management: Who Participmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coalition Politics and Inter‐Party Conflict Management: A Theoretical Framework

Vercesi

2016

Politics & Policy

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“…This is important not only for operational purposes, but because it sets a threshold for determining who actually has the ability to affect spending decisions. One recent study suggests that relying on function to operationalize a definition can present more complications than departing from a legal, institutional understanding (Barbieri and Vercesi 2013). A standard approach is to count only officials with full ministerial rank, thus excluding deputy ministers, secretaries of state, regional ministers or other officials who would add even more to these numbers (van de Walle 2001).…”

Section: Are Africa’s Cabinets Cumbersome?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Parties or Portfolio? The Economic Consequences of Africa’s Big Cabinets

LeVan¹,

Assenov²

2015

Gov. & oppos.

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Does cabinet size have an impact on economic policy in Africa? The average number of ministers has increased steadily for four decades, yet we know little about the economic effects of new portfolios, despite popular complaints about costly cabinets. Comparative studies generate conflicting expectations, either blaming coalition governments for patronage or crediting them with economic restraint. Using data on 45 Sub-Saharan African countries between 1971 and 2006, our empirical analysis links parties and portfolios to budgetary policy performance. We show that cabinets with more ministries are associated with budget surpluses, but they are also slightly more likely to engage in patronage spending. Next, we find that cabinets governing through multiparty coalitions have no consistent impact on budget surpluses. However, they are strongly associated with less extractive government and lower rates of patronage spending compared with single-party cabinets. These results hold after controlling for the type of colonial legacy, economic conditions, population size, constraints on executives, level of democracy, oil income, type of party system and ethnic and religious fractionalization. We conclude that parties and portfolios are both important but they have different effects: adding portfolios to the cabinet may improve economic outcomes by enhancing specialization, but governance through multiparty cabinets generates incentives to both limit extraction and restrain patronage spending.

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“…Several studies of prime ministers (e.g. Jones 1991;Pasquino 2005b;Poguntke and Webb 2007) have shown that, of the party-related factors, leadership of the coalition and party leadership (Barbieri and Vercesi 2013) are more crucial resources than others. For this reason, I have mainly focused on them, and the remainder of the article is based on this theoretical premise.…”

Section: The Theoretical Premisementioning

confidence: 99%

Party, coalition, premiership: the role of Silvio Berlusconi in coalition dynamics and its determinants

Vercesi

2013

Contemporary Italian Politics

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Silvio Berlusconi has unquestionably been one of Italy's most important political figures since the early 1990s. The general election campaign of February 2013 demonstrated that he is anything but out of the political game. Consequently, it seems worthwhile to examine Berlusconi as a prime minister and coalition leader. This article seeks to understand the extent to which he was able to command and guide his governing coalition, as Prime Minister, as well as his influence and the constraints on his actions. After presenting the theoretical framework, the article examines Berlusconi within the context of Italian political history and explores his impact on coalition governance by illustrating two cases of how he managed intra-coalition conflicts during his second term of office. Finally, it discusses the findings and highlights the resources Berlusconi was able to deploy 'against' his allies and the constraints he faced as Prime Minister. A brief comparison of Berlusconi and other Italian prime ministers is provided.

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The Cabinet: A Viable Definition and its Composition in View of a Comparative Analysis

Cited by 12 publications

References 35 publications

Coalition Politics and Inter‐Party Conflict Management: A Theoretical Framework

Coalition Politics and Inter‐Party Conflict Management: A Theoretical Framework

Parties or Portfolio? The Economic Consequences of Africa’s Big Cabinets

Party, coalition, premiership: the role of Silvio Berlusconi in coalition dynamics and its determinants

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