The Brussels I - Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001

Heß, Burkhard; Schlosser, Peter

doi:10.5771/9783845266381

Cited by 108 publications

(24 citation statements)

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“…69 In my view, it is better for the EU legislator not to regulate this matter than to regulate it partially. It is true that the dividing line between court proceedings and arbitration is not always clear, 70 for example where the parties have taken up an arbitration clause in their contract but one of the parties institutes proceedings in a court of a Member State. In such situation, the Court of Justice has ruled that the Member State court is not permitted to grant an anti-suit injunction.…”

Section: Materials Scope: a Few Selected Aspects Including Arbitrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Disorderly Infiltration of EU Law in Civil Procedure

Kruger

2016

Neth Int Law Rev

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Since 1968 the European Union (or the European Economic Community as it then was) has legislated in the field of civil procedure. These rules do not replace domestic laws and codes of civil procedure, but gradually take over aspects in the field: it infiltrates. The purpose of this article is to show that this infiltration is chaotic rather than logical. It discusses certain aspects of the scope of EU legislation in the field of civil procedure, provisional measures, the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and systemic hurdles for a more logical delineation between the EU and domestic spheres of the law. It shows the disorderly infiltration without offering a definite solution, taking the view that such disorderliness is inescapable in light of the current state of EU law on civil procedure and political realities.

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Section: Materials Scope: a Few Selected Aspects Including Arbitrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Disorderly Infiltration of EU Law in Civil Procedure

Kruger

2016

Neth Int Law Rev

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“…From the Heidelberg report, evaluating the Brussels I Regulation, it is clear that the provision on choice of court agreements generally functions well. Several persisting problems in the application in the Member States were identified, 64 most of which were picked up in the Green Paper 65 and in the following Commission proposal, 66 and have been tackled in the Brussels I-bis Regulation. 67 A general issue concerned the functioning of the Brussels I Regulation in the international legal order, in particular the scope of the rules, including the choice of court provision, vis-à-vis third country parties.…”

Section: The Brussels Regime: Development and Shortcomingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Party Autonomy Paradigm: European and Global Developments on Choice of Forum

Kramer

Themeli

2016

Brussels Ibis Regulation

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One of the pillars of international commercial litigation is party autonomy as it has developed over the past fifty years. In Europe, the Brussels regime established considerable freedom for parties to select the court that would have jurisdiction. The enforceability of choice of court agreements has gained ground in many countries worldwide, and the freedom to select the competent forum is exercised widely in commercial practice. Early in 2015, the new Brussels I-bis Regulation became applicable, altering the rules on choice of court. These amendments, particularly the exception to the lis pendens rule, aim at increasing the efficiency of choice of court agreements and at preventing torpedo litigation tactics. This year also marks the entry into force of the Hague Choice of Court Convention that had been adopted ten years earlier. The present paper explores the concept and development of the party autonomy paradigm from the perspective of different disciplines, and discusses the empirical evidence available on the use of party autonomy in commercial practice. It also examines the main changes brought about by the Brussels I recast and the entry into force of the Hague Choice of Court Convention, and analyses these against the background of the party autonomy paradigm, as well as their contribution to effective litigation.

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“…Es war allgemein erwartet worden, dass der EuGH mit der Entscheidung weitere Hindernisse der Freizügigkeit von Gesellschaften beseitigen würde 48 . Im Kern bestätigte der EuGH dennoch die Erwartungen der bisherigen Rechtsprechung 49 …”

Section: D) Anmerkungen Zum Cartesio-urteilunclassified

“…Man wird wohl davon ausgehen müssen, dass dies nicht erst mit dem völkerrechtlichen Inkrafttreten des Protokolls eintritt, sondern aufgrund des entsprechenden Ratsbeschlusses bereits mit der Anwendung des Protokolls innerhalb der EU. 45 Siehe oben unter IV. …”

Section: Das Haager Protokoll Von 2007 38unclassified