Electricity Network Regulation in the EU 2018
DOI: 10.4337/9781786436092.00011
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The British reference model

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Cited by 7 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…Traditionally, the primary objective of monopoly regulation was to cut costs. This was done in several countries by moving from cost-plus to incentive regulation, with GB playing a pioneering role (see, e.g., Jamasb and Pollitt (2007) and Rious and Rossetto (2018)). However, in order to costeffectively integrate more and more renewables and fully leverage the new opportunities enabled by digitalisation, additional incentives for the uptake of innovation were needed.…”
Section: Regulatory Tools To Foster Innovationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Traditionally, the primary objective of monopoly regulation was to cut costs. This was done in several countries by moving from cost-plus to incentive regulation, with GB playing a pioneering role (see, e.g., Jamasb and Pollitt (2007) and Rious and Rossetto (2018)). However, in order to costeffectively integrate more and more renewables and fully leverage the new opportunities enabled by digitalisation, additional incentives for the uptake of innovation were needed.…”
Section: Regulatory Tools To Foster Innovationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…-RIIO, at OFGEM As already seen with the offshore case, the new British regulatory frameworkestablished about ten years agoconsiders the incentive frame as key to the success of grid regulation. It is also the message conveyed by the conceptual formula 'Revenues = Incentives + Innovation + Outputs' (Rious and Rossetto 2018). Incentives are targeting both Capex and Opex, in an open 'menu of contracts' where companies reveal their own core choices (such as choosing to design and build the grid, or to externalise that, as in the offshore case).…”
Section: Building An Efficient Loop Between the Business Models For Grid Users And Grid Companiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As already seen with the offshore case, the new British regulatory frameworkestablished about ten years agoconsiders the incentive frame as key to the success of grid regulation. It is also the message conveyed by the conceptual formula 'Revenues = Incentives + Innovation + Outputs' (Rious and Rossetto 2018). Incentives are targeting both Capex and Opex, in an open 'menu of contracts' where companies reveal their own core choices (such as choosing to design and build the grid, or to externalise that, as in the offshore case).…”
Section: Riio At Ofgemmentioning
confidence: 99%