2000
DOI: 10.1080/01402380008425349
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The British Labour Party and monetary union

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Cited by 51 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…The third alternative would have been to declare that, after reassessing the economic case for monetary union, the government will not seek membership of the single currency. Although being at odds with Labour's 1997 manifesto, this option was favoured by a minority of outright opponents of monetary union among Labour MPs (Gamble and Kelly :11–20).…”
Section: Issue Salience and Noncompensatory Domestic Political Loss Amentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The third alternative would have been to declare that, after reassessing the economic case for monetary union, the government will not seek membership of the single currency. Although being at odds with Labour's 1997 manifesto, this option was favoured by a minority of outright opponents of monetary union among Labour MPs (Gamble and Kelly :11–20).…”
Section: Issue Salience and Noncompensatory Domestic Political Loss Amentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Both Labour and the Conservatives must tolerate a degree of internal dissent and both must tailor at least some of their programmes and policies towards these supporters. This is especially true for the Conservative party (Berrington & Hague 1998) but Labour must also still play this game with its left-wing and some of the affiliated trade unions such as the RMT (transport union) (Gamble & Kelly 2000). Major and Blair both embraced a policy centred on economic appropriateness and a referendum in order to defuse the divisiveness of the issue within their respective parties.…”
Section: The Domestic Politics Of British Policy On the Euro 49mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Consequently, in order to lessen risk and to remove the threats to governing competence, various governments have continually searched for strategies to lessen the risk of devaluation and more particularly to find mechanisms to deflect blame (see Gamble and Kelly 2000; for a discussion of blame avoidance see Hood 2002). These have essentially all failed.…”
Section: Mad Money: Exchange Rate Policy 1964–1997mentioning
confidence: 99%