The Boko Haram Paradox: Ethnicity, Religion, and Historical Memory in Pursuit of a Caliphate

Pieri, Zacharias P.; Zenn, Jacob

doi:10.1080/19392206.2016.1132906

Cited by 40 publications

(15 citation statements)

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“…It first frames the rebels in relation to the hostile Takfiri stance against moderate Muslims who do not strictly adhere to the Islamic teachings, thus threatening the security of Muslim communities in general. Secondly, Takfiri ideology rejects all of the manifestations of Westernization, liberalism and the concept of democracy, considering them an indication of relegation to apostasy (Pieri and Zenn 2016). Accordingly, framing the rebels within Takfirism informs two semantic macrostructures: religious radicalism and anti-West (Figure 9).…”

Section: Takfirimentioning

confidence: 99%

Media Bias: A Corpus-based Linguistic Analysis of Online Iranian Coverage of the Syrian Revolution

Al-Gamde

Tenbrink

2020

Open Linguistics

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This study explores the influence of a government’s ideology on linguistic representation in a news agency that characterizes itself as independent. It focuses on the coverage of the Syrian civil war as reported by the Iranian news agency Fars, addressing the discursive constructions of anti-government powers in relevant online reports released between 2013 and 2015. Since the Islamic Republic of Iran was a major regional ally of the Syrian government, we questioned the extent to which ideological independence could be expected during a politically critical time frame. Taking a corpus-based linguistic approach, the study explores the semantic macrostructures representing the opposition as well as the lexical clusters and keywords characterizing the news discourse. The findings indicate that Fars’ representation of the Syrian Revolution was, to some extent, biased, despite its claimed independence of the government’s political stance. It excluded the Sunni social actors, suppressed the Islamic faction identity of the rebels and depicted the uprising as a war against foreign-backed militants. The rebels were stereotyped in terms of terrorism and non-Syrians. In addition, the analysis reveals Fars’ tendency to emphasize the power of the government, depicting it as the defender of the Arab land and foregrounding the discourse of international conspiracy against Syria. The results of this work project the dimension of media bias caused by the underpinning political perspective of media institutions.

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Section: Takfirimentioning

confidence: 99%

Media Bias: A Corpus-based Linguistic Analysis of Online Iranian Coverage of the Syrian Revolution

Al-Gamde

Tenbrink

2020

Open Linguistics

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“…In essence the youth are chanting that Nigeria will tomorrow no longer exist – it will be conquered or its territory will be separated from it into Boko Haram's ‘caliphate’. This is something that Boko Haram has long talked about, especially as they do not regard Nigeria as a legitimate entity, but rather as a colonial construct that put an end to the legitimate pre-existing Islamic states of the region, notably the Kanem-Borno Empire and the Caliphate of Sokoto (Pieri & Zenn 2016). They extend the defeat of the Nigerian state to further tie it to the defeat of the United States of America which is seen as the primary exporter of values that Boko Haram and other jihadist movements oppose.…”

Section: Communicating External Affairs Of the ‘Caliphate’mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In August 2014, Abubakar Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram, declared the establishment of an ‘Islamic state’ ( dawla islamiya ), a so-called caliphate, in areas of north-eastern Nigeria under his movement's control 1 . This was the culmination of Boko Haram's long-term goal to ‘carve out’ territory for an Islamic entity in northern Nigeria and was consistent with the sermons of Muhammad Yusuf (Shekau's predecessor as leader of Boko Haram) as well as statements by Abu Qaqa, Boko Haram's former spokesman: ‘We do not have any agenda than working to establish an Islamic kingdom like during the time of Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) no matter what will happen to us.’ 2 Within one year of this announcement, Boko Haram proceeded to annex into its territory dozens of towns in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States (Pieri & Zenn 2016: 66; Thurston 2018: 225). Though the Nigerian military in concert with the militaries of neighbouring countries were able to reclaim some land seized by Boko Haram in the lead up to and in the months after the Nigerian general and presidential elections of 2015, Shekau's formal announcement of an ‘Islamic state’ and his pledging of allegiance ( baya’ ) to the Islamic State (in Syria and Iraq) in March 2015 demonstrated the seriousness of Boko Haram's message 3…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Under the Black Flag in Borno: experiences of foot soldiers and civilians in Boko Haram's ‘caliphate’

Pieri

Zenn

2018

J. Mod. Afr. Stud.

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Boko Haram's operations and ideology have been the subject of increasing research in recent years. This article, in contrast, explores the culture of Boko Haram through an ethnographic analysis of the group's internal videos that were not intended for public release. The authors find that in their everyday lives Boko Haram foot soldiers are different from the image the group presents to the world in propaganda videos. While unmistakably a violent movement, in territories under the group's control that it attempted to administer, foot soldiers participated in conflict resolution with elders, explained the group's position on external alliances to villagers, engaged in recreation to pass time off the battlefield and created bonds of solidarity with other members of the group. Using insights from anthropology and the examination of ‘Jihadi Culture’, this article's insights help us understand how and why Boko Haram foot soldiers fight beyond the group's public ideology or stated goals: for many of them, it is simply a lifestyle.

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“…Boko Haram 1 emerged around 2002 in Maiduguri, in Nigeria’s northeastern state of Borno. Muhammad Yusuf formed the group out of dissatisfaction with more mainstream Salafist movements in the region (Pieri & Zenn, 2016; “The black,” 2015). Boko Haram’s formation came at an opportune time, as the seeds of discontent had already been sown in Nigeria’s Muslim-dominated northern states, where violent Islamists had previously staged a failed uprising.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Countering Boko Haram’s Violence: A Deterrence–Backlash Perspective

Dulin

Patiño

2018

Armed Forces & Society

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This article examines efforts to counter Boko Haram’s campaign of terrorism in Northern Nigeria from a deterrence–backlash perspective. Drawing from previous research, the authors develop hypothetical expectations for deterrence and backlash effects when counterterrorism policies are conducted at governmental and community levels. Using parametric survival analysis, the authors conclude that government policies designed to curb Boko Haram attacks resulted in backlash. Conversely, community-based efforts resulted in deterrence.

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The Boko Haram Paradox: Ethnicity, Religion, and Historical Memory in Pursuit of a Caliphate

Cited by 40 publications

References 0 publications

Media Bias: A Corpus-based Linguistic Analysis of Online Iranian Coverage of the Syrian Revolution

Media Bias: A Corpus-based Linguistic Analysis of Online Iranian Coverage of the Syrian Revolution

Under the Black Flag in Borno: experiences of foot soldiers and civilians in Boko Haram's ‘caliphate’

Countering Boko Haram’s Violence: A Deterrence–Backlash Perspective

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