2021
DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2020.1860950
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The “Boko Haram Disaggregation Problem” and Comparative Profiles of Factional Violence: Challenges, Impacts, and Solutions in the Study of Africa’s Deadliest Terror Group(s)

Abstract: This article introduces the "Boko Haram disaggregation problem," or the often frequent failure by observers to disaggregate the group following its August 2016 split into two distinct factions, instead, labeling and studying all factions as "Boko Haram." It asks: What are the origins of the "Boko Haram disaggregation problem," and, given this phenomenon, what are the possibilities and constraints in understanding profiles of violence between the pre-2016 and post-2016 iterations of the group(s)? It argues that… Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
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“…press releases (Mohammed 2014;Thurston 2018;Kendhammer and McCain 2018). Some researchers have used a variety of data bases of violent incidents to identify patterns and changes (Pearson and Zenn 2021;Warner and Lizzo 2021). Others have tried to complement these sources with rare official documents, including Wikileaks documents and a few internal jihadi documents made available ex post facto by the United States authorities or by jihadi apologists (Thurston 2018;Zenn 2020;Brigaglia & Iocchi 2020).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…press releases (Mohammed 2014;Thurston 2018;Kendhammer and McCain 2018). Some researchers have used a variety of data bases of violent incidents to identify patterns and changes (Pearson and Zenn 2021;Warner and Lizzo 2021). Others have tried to complement these sources with rare official documents, including Wikileaks documents and a few internal jihadi documents made available ex post facto by the United States authorities or by jihadi apologists (Thurston 2018;Zenn 2020;Brigaglia & Iocchi 2020).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%