The Blue Slip: A Theory of Unified and Divided Government, 1979–2009

Sollenberger, Mitchel A.

doi:10.1080/07343460903394218

Cited by 8 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…The effects of a negative blue slip have varied dramatically between 1913—when the first blue slip appeared (Binder ; Sollenberger )—and today . Chairs initially did not treat blue slips as dispositive.…”

Section: Obstruction In the Modern Senate: Filibusters Holds And Blmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…During his tenure, a negative blue slip or unreturned blue slip from a single home state senator blocked any further action on the nomination. Why Eastland changed blue slipping policy is unclear, though racial politics likely had something to do with it, as Eastland could use committee rules to block pro–civil rights nominees from reaching the bench (Sollenberger , 130). While later Judiciary Committee chairs would also alter their treatment of negative blue slips depending on political context, a single blue slip continues to impose a strong and negative effect on any nomination's chance of success.…”

Section: Obstruction In the Modern Senate: Filibusters Holds And Blmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Denning (, ) briefly examines the constitutionality of blue slips, and suggests reforms to the appointment process . Sollenberger () analyzes how different Judiciary Committee chairs have treated blue slips across time and political contexts. Steigerwalt () examined newspaper articles that addressed senators' negative blue slips for circuit court nominations between 1985 and 2006.…”

Section: Obstruction In the Modern Senate: Filibusters Holds And Blmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Qualifications or Philosophy? The Use of Blue Slips in a Polarized Era

Black

Madonna²,

Owens³

2014

Pres Stud Q

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In recent years, judicial nominations to lower federal courts have been blocked privately by negative blue slips returned by home state senators. We examine the conditions under which senators return negative blue slips and discover two results. First, consistent with existing work, ideology plays a strong role in blue slipping. Second, and more important, we find that nominee qualifications mitigate ideological extremism—but only for district court nominees. That is, in the past, presidents could use legal credentials to prop up district court and circuit court nominees who shared his views. Today, in a Senate marked by high polarization and few moderates,the president cannot.

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Section: Obstruction In the Modern Senate: Filibusters Holds And Blmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Obstruction In the Modern Senate: Filibusters Holds And Blmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Obstruction In the Modern Senate: Filibusters Holds And Blmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Qualifications or Philosophy? The Use of Blue Slips in a Polarized Era

Black

Madonna²,

Owens³

2014

Pres Stud Q

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…Accordingly, home‐state senators of the president's party have a large influence on the selection of district court judges (Sheldon and Maule 1997, 147). The tradition of senatorial courtesy, embodied in the “blue slip” process, heavily influences most district court nominations, particularly if home‐state senators share the president's party (Bell 2002; Binder 2007; Sheldon and Maule 1997; see also Sollenberger 2010). Despite the lack of scholarly attention to the subject, geography and the related topic of senatorial courtesy also clearly affect circuit court nominations.…”

Section: Geography and Nominations To The District Courts And Supremementioning

confidence: 99%

Assessing Changes in State Representation on the U.S. Courts of Appeals

Scott

Garrett

2011

Pres Stud Q

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When a seat becomes vacant on a federal court of appeals, the president has the opportunity to nominate a new judge for the Senate's consideration. Geography is often a factor in the decision, particularly in determining whether the new judge will be nominated from the same state as the predecessor. Goldman refers to state affiliations on appeals courts (e.g., a “Missouri seat” or an “Ohio seat”) as “state representation.” Building on Goldman's work, we seek to accomplish two objectives. First, we demonstrate that although changes in state representation have declined over time, there are still occasions when presidents change the state representation of seats. Second, we investigate and analyze changes in state representation of circuit court judges confirmed since 1891 to test hypotheses about factors that influence changes in state representation.

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“…These studies have included consideration of divided government (Bell 2002b;Binder and Maltzman 2002;Scherer et al 2008;Sollenberger 2010), the size of the opposing party's delegation in the Senate (Nixon and Goss 2001), the ideological distance between the president and a key member of the Senate (Basinger and Mak 2010;Binder andMaltzman 2002, 2009;Primo et al 2008;Scherer et al 2008), and the proportion of opposing-party members on the Judiciary Committee (Martinek et al 2002). Previous descriptive analyses have found that most of the delay seen in the modern confirmation process occurs at the committee stage (Goldman 2003;Goldman et al 2011;Slotnick and Goldman 1998), and that the Judiciary Committee chair is particularly important in determining the extent of delay imposed by the committee (Scherer 2005).…”

Section: Political Considerationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Confirmation Obstacle Course: Signaling Opposition through Delay

Holmes¹,

Shomade²,

Hartley³

2012

ARP

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We examine the time required for lower federal court nominees to complete the confirmation process. Using proportional hazards models, we analyze delay at the Judiciary Committee stage and the full Senate vote stage from 1977 to 2010, finding that delay has been used by members of the committee and the full Senate to signal opposition to nominees. Delay at the committee stage has influenced delay on the Senate floor for circuit and district court nominees, at least in the years since Robert Bork’s failed nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court. Our findings indicate that senators pick up on committee delay as a cue in the confirmation process. Examining the distinct stages of the confirmation process provides important new insights into legislative signaling behavior and confirmation politics.

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The Blue Slip: A Theory of Unified and Divided Government, 1979–2009

Cited by 8 publications

References 13 publications

Qualifications or Philosophy? The Use of Blue Slips in a Polarized Era

Qualifications or Philosophy? The Use of Blue Slips in a Polarized Era

Assessing Changes in State Representation on the U.S. Courts of Appeals

The Confirmation Obstacle Course: Signaling Opposition through Delay

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