The bloodstained spear: public reason and declarations of war

Abstract

States rarely declare war. For many international law scholars, just war theorists, and moral philosophers, the declaration of war is a moribund tradition that serves no important purpose. When declarations of war are defended, the argument is situated in the war powers debate about executive authority. In contrast, I argue that declaring war – making conditional and reasoned moral demands – continues to be an important requirement for just wars. States should declare war because states should make explicit (formal) moral demands before fighting. Declaring war is procedurally important because it ensures that a state makes a formal moral case, showing respect to innocent third parties whose interests are affected and providing targets the right to confront their accusers and hear evidence. While not a panacea, requiring declarations is a significant improvement on the ad hoc politics of wartime justification that plagues wars such as Iraq. Further, declarations, as ultimatums, are the only reasonable interpretation of the ‘last resort’ requirement in just war theory. A final section extends the argument to contemporary wars against non-state actors, showing that a politics of recognition underlying declarations of war may prove especially fruitful today.

Why norms rarely die

“…The requirement that states declare war before initiating hostilities is at least as old as the Roman Empire (Fazal, 2012: 557; Grynaviski, 2013). The practice of declaring war was common in the 19th century and into the mid-20th century but has fallen off nearly to nothing since (Fazal, 2012: 557–558).…”

“…The practice of declaring war was common in the 19th century and into the mid-20th century but has fallen off nearly to nothing since (Fazal, 2012: 557–558). The heart of the requirement was that “war should be declared, conditional, and reasoned” (Grynaviski, 2013: 238–239). Or, as Fazal (2012) puts it, “Historically, the content of declarations of war also serves as the justifications for war and the statements of war aims, roles that are important for international as well as domestic consumption” (p. 561).…”

A Particular Difference: European Identity and Civilian Targeting

“…Of the scholars whose work we revisit in this article, only Morrow finds any significant predictors of restraint, and the conditions under which 61 With the exception of declarations of war, which Morrow himself does not analyze in the article discussed here. For separate analyses of declarations of war, see Fazal (2012) and Grynaviski (2013). 62 This finding is somewhat weaker with respect to prisoners of war.…”

“… 61 With the exception of declarations of war, which Morrow himself does not analyze in the article discussed here. For separate analyses of declarations of war, see Fazal (2012) and Grynaviski (2013). …”