The Biodiversity Bargaining Problem

Gatti, John; Goeschl, Timo; Groom, Ben; Swanson, Timothy

doi:10.1007/s10640-010-9416-z

Cited by 14 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…Given the interdependence of the North and South in the biotech industry it seems unlikely that the South could gain from this exercise, and likely that this will be an extremely stringent condition. Nevertheless, Gatti et al (2011) show that this will be the case if the social marginal value of reserves increases rapidly as reserves become scarce. Specifically, the social marginal value of reserves must be higher in conflict than on the bargaining frontier.…”

Section: Strategic Destruction As a Rational Threatmentioning

confidence: 98%

Regulating global biodiversity: what is the problem?

Swanson¹,

Groom²

2012

Oxford Review of Economic Policy

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SummaryWe distinguish between local problems of biodiversity loss and global ones, where international cooperation is required. Global biodiversity regulation involves choosing the optimal stopping rule regarding global land conversions, in order to ensure that some areas of unconverted natural reserves remain to support the production sector that exists on converted lands. The basic difficulty with implementing a solution to this global problem lies in the asymmetry in endowments between those states that have previously converted, and those that have not. We demonstrate that the fundamental problem of global biodiversity regulation is similar to the bargaining problem analysed by Nash, Rubinstein and others. There are benefits from global land conversion, and there must be agreement on their distribution before the conversion process can be halted. Since the institutions addressing global biodiversity problems are either highly ineffectual (benefit sharing agreements, prior informed consent clauses) or very extreme (incremental cost contracts), the biodiversity bargaining problem remains unresolved. For this reason we anticipate that suboptimal conversions will continue to occur, as a way of protesting the ineffective and unfair approaches employed in addressing this problem to date.

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Section: Strategic Destruction As a Rational Threatmentioning

confidence: 98%

Regulating global biodiversity: what is the problem?

Swanson¹,

Groom²

2012

Oxford Review of Economic Policy

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“…Examples include climate mitigation (Fischer and Newell, 2008;Finus, Kotsogiannis, and McCorriston, 2013), biodiversity conservation (Goeschl and Swanson, 2002;Gatti et al, 2011), and protection of fisheries (Underdal, 1980). Our interest is in multilateral strategies for the funding of environmental protection.…”

Section: Environmental Protection Negative Externalities and Multilmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Only recently, scholars have started to study how bargaining affects environmental cooperation. For example, Caparrós and Péreau (2013) examine the implications of coalition formation for bargaining in North-South climate agreements and Gatti et al (2011) analyze bargaining for biodiversity conservation. In contrast to our contribution, these recent works miss the opportunity to link bargaining with non-cooperative participation incentives.…”

Section: Environmental Protection Negative Externalities and Multilmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…While previous research -starting with early contributions by Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), Barrett (1994b), and Hoel (1992) -has recognized the participation problem and examined bilateral donorrecipient bargaining (Gatti et al, 2011), the literature has not yet combined these elements. Empirically, the relationship between participation and bargaining is a timely topic.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Does It Pay to Play? How Bargaining Shapes Donor Participation in the Funding of Environmental Protection

Bayer

Urpelainen

2014

SBE

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Multilateral funding for global environmental protection, such as biodiversity conservation, requires donor participation. When are donors willing to participate? We examine a game-theoretic model of multilateral funding for environmental projects in developing countries. Donors must first decide whether to participate in a multilateral institution. They do so in anticipation of a bargaining outcome that depends on their participation decisions. The multilateral institution then bargains with a recipient over the distribution of gains from project implementation. We find that the donors' and the recipient's vulnerability to negative environmental externalities have diverging effects on their participation behavior. As donors' vulnerability to negative externalities increases, their bargaining power decreases and fewer donors participate. But as the recipient's vulnerability increases, more donors participate because their bargaining power grows. These findings can illuminate bargaining over multilateral climate finance and inform the design of international institutions. * This paper was written during a research stay funded by an ERP fellowship of the Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes. Patrick Bayer gratefully acknowledges this generous funding and is thankful for the hospitality of Columbia University. We thank Christopher Marcoux, Michael Rubin, Ariel Dinar, and the reviewers for insightful comments on a previous draft. An online appendix contains model extensions and technical details.

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“…Swanson (1994), Barbier and Schulz (1997) and Endres and Radke (1999) consider the optimal area of a habitat when the variety of species yields utility, comparing the benefits of maintaining the habitat with those of using land in production. Barrett (1994), Swanson (1996), Sarr et al (2008), Gatti et al (2011) examine biodiversity management in a world where some countries (called the "South") are highly endowed with biodiversity, while the others (called the "North") are the primary location of the research and development industries relying upon these resources. In that case, the problem is how developing countries should be compensated for the "incremental costs"of biodiversity conservation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulation versus subsidies in conservation with a self-interested policy maker

Palokangas

2016

Environ Econ Policy Stud

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This article examines the following case. A set of countries produce goods from labor, government input and natural resources. Because the conservation of natural resources in any country yields utility (e.g. through biodiversity) in every country, and because there is no benevolent international government, a resident of the countries is chosen as the regulator to whom conservation policy is delegated. The countries influence the regulator by their political contributions. In this common agency setup, the following result is proven: as long as the minimum conservation standards are implemented, conservation subsidies are welfare decreasing, involving excessive conservation. This suggests that there should be no "co-financing" for designated conservation sites in the EU NATURA 2000 project. Journal of Economic Literature: H23, F15, Q24

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The Biodiversity Bargaining Problem

Cited by 14 publications

References 19 publications

Regulating global biodiversity: what is the problem?

Regulating global biodiversity: what is the problem?

Does It Pay to Play? How Bargaining Shapes Donor Participation in the Funding of Environmental Protection

Regulation versus subsidies in conservation with a self-interested policy maker

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