The Berge Equilibrium in Cournot Oligopoly Model

Kudryavtsev, Konstantin; Ukhobotov, V.I.; Zhukovskiy, Vladislav I.

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-10934-9_29

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2020

2021

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Cited by 4 publications

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“…It is worth noting that the Berge equilibrium solves such well known paradoxes in game theory as the "Prisoner's Dilemma", "Battle of the sexes" and many others. Also the use of Berge equilibrium is possible to applications in economics [10].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Weak Berge Equilibrium in Finite Three-person Games: Conception and Computation

Kudryavtsev

Malkov

2020

Open Computer Science

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The paper proposes the concept of a weak Berge equilibrium. Unlike the Berge equilibrium, the moral basis of this equilibrium is the Hippocratic Oath “First do no harm”. On the other hand, any Berge equilibrium is a weak Berge equilibrium. But, there are weak Berge equilibria, which are not the Berge equilibria. The properties of the weak Berge equilibrium have been investigated. The existence of the weak Berge equilibrium in mixed strategies has been established for finite games. The weak Berge equilibria for finite three-person non-cooperative games are computed.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%