The Berge Equilibrium: A Game-Theoretic Framework for the Golden Rule of Ethics

Salukvadze, Mindia E.; Zhukovskiy, Vladislav I.

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-25546-6

Cited by 11 publications

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“…Having shown that team reasoning cannot be viewed as a payoff transformation, I conclude by commenting that team reasoning is not the only modification of standard game-theoretic reasoning that can explain strategic coordination in games with payoff-dominant Nash equilibria. Three other notable suggestions are cognitive hierarchy theory ), Berge equilibrium (Colman et al 2011;Salukvadze and Zhukovskiy 2020) and strong Stackelberg reasoning (Colman and Bacharach 1997;Colman et al 2014;Pulford et al 2014). Cognitive hierarchy theory abandons the standard common knowledge of rationality assumption in favour of an assumption that players choose best responses to their co-players' expected strategies given an assumption that their co-players choose their own strategies using a shallower depth of strategic reasoning than they use themselves.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Team reasoning cannot be viewed as a payoff transformation

Colman

2022

Economics and Philosophy

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In a recent article in this journal, Duijf claims to have proved that team reasoning can be viewed as a payoff transformation. His formalization mimics team reasoning but ignores its essential agency switch. The possibility of such a payoff transformation was never in doubt, does not imply that team reasoning can be viewed as a payoff transformation, and makes no sense in a game in which payoffs represent players’ utilities. A theorem is proved here that a simpler and more intuitive payoff transformation can mimic any theory that predicts what strategies players will choose in a well-defined game.

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