The benefits of a right to silence for the innocent

Abstract

This article shows that innocent suspects benefit from exercising their right to silence during criminal proceedings. We present a model in which a criminal suspect can either make a statement or remain silent during police interrogation. At trial, the jury observes informative but imperfect signals about the suspect's guilt and the truthfulness of the suspect's statement. We show that a right to silence benefits innocent suspects by providing them with a safer alternative to speech, as well as by reducing the probability of wrongful conviction for suspects who remain silent with and without a right to silence. Copyright (c) 2010, RAND.

Lie Detection: A Strategic Analysis of the Verifiability Approach

“…The shifts in the informative equilibria I P and I P V are in line with the effects of a right to silence identified by the game theoretic analyses of Seidmann (2005) and Leshem (2010) (see also Seidmann and Stein (2000) and Mialon (2005)). In particular, the innocent type benefits from such a right in two ways.…”

“…3 The right to silence has been analysed from a game-theoretic perspective by Seidmann and Stein (2000), Seidmann (2005), Mialon (2005) and Leshem (2010). In Subsection 5.2 we discuss the insights from these studies within the context of our model.…”

Torture in counterterrorism: Agency incentives and slippery slopes

“…If one considers avoidance of torture an individual right, the small but growing literature on the economics of individual rights is relevant. 11 Seidmann and Stein (2000), Mialon (2005), Leshem (2009), and Wickelgren (2010) examine the right to silence. These papers analyze the effects of preventing adverse inferences from a suspect's silence during interrogation, but they do not analyze the arguably more fundamental right against torture in interrogation.…”

Disclosure and Legal Advice

“…Sanchirico and Triantis (2008) study costly evidence fabrication and efficiency of adjudication in the context of contractual disputes. 2 Seidmann (2005), Mialon (2005) and Leshem (2010) investigate the effect of the defendant's right to silence, with and without adverse inference by the adjudicator, on the adjudication outcomes and welfare. Shchepetova (2014) compares costly evidence production in inquisitorial and adversarial systems.…”