The Beginning of Community: Politics in the Face of Disagreement

Ebels-Duggan, Kyla

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.591.x

Cited by 49 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…If positive support for SSM is not possible, then other political options still remain for such citizens. Kyla Ebels‐Duggan and Douglas Laycock argue for an alternative approach of moral compromise or avoidance, seeking to lower the temperature of the SSM debate by proposing that the word marriage be taken out of the legal equation altogether and be replaced by civil unions on a sex‐neutral basis (Ebels‐Duggan , 66; Laycock , 206–7). But as the Vatican categorically opposes even civil unions for same‐sex partners, I assume this solution would be verboten for Beckwith (see CDF ).…”

Section: Sex‐neutral Civil Marriage and The Right To Religious Freedommentioning

confidence: 99%

Public Reason Liberalism and Sex‐Neutral Marriage A Response to Francis J. Beckwith

Walker

2015

Ratio Juris

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article responds to an article by Francis J. Beckwith that argued that the consistent application of generic liberal principles requires that same‐sex marriage not be recognised in civil law. This response demonstrates that Beckwith's article contains a series of interpretative and substantive flaws that render his argument unsuccessful. These relate to a misinterpretation of core liberal principles and a sidestepping of the matter of undue bias against same‐sex partners. In correcting these flaws I tentatively propose a Voltairean argument in favour of same‐sex civil marriage for those citizens with moral qualms about same‐sex relationships derived from their reasonable comprehensive doctrine.

show abstract

Section: Sex‐neutral Civil Marriage and The Right To Religious Freedommentioning

confidence: 99%

Public Reason Liberalism and Sex‐Neutral Marriage A Response to Francis J. Beckwith

Walker

2015

Ratio Juris

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…If they are willing to forgo their own share of the common good for some moral principle they care about, then it seems more reasonable to ask their fellow citizens to allow them to make this sacrifice, even if they disagree about the moral importance of character. Here is the point: voting on character is fundamentally compatible with a desire to govern cooperatively with one's fellow citizens (compare Ebels-Duggan, 2010). In this way, it differs from voting to affect policy for one's private good, which is fundamentally non-cooperative in that it weights one's own interests more than the interests of fellow citizens.…”

Section: Character Voting Defendedmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Where policy differences implicate fewer values, character differences may play a larger role. Some official defenses of political liberalism grant that the requirement for public reason is defeasible (Ebels-Duggan, 2010), and my effort here is just to elaborate enough on the competing values to provide some guidance on how weighing might proceed. There is no need to think that some discretion should not be left to voters, themselves, as well.…”

Section: Character Voting Defendedmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Moral Defense of the ‘Moral Values’ Voter

Davis

2011

Political Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

How should citizens in a democracy decide for whom to vote? Liberal political philosophers, following Rawls, have held that voters should think of the candidate as a proxy for the policies he or she will predictably help put in place, and then vote according to which policies are best supported by the balance of public reasons. Call this the proxy model. I reject the proxy model as too restrictive a moral requirement on voting, but accept that citizens are obligated to use some reasons rather than others. In particular, voters should only weigh considerations that are morally relevant. These may include factors like the character of the candidate. I argue that this alternative to the proxy model is more faithful to liberal theory and places a more reasonable set of demands on voters, given what political science has taught us about voting behavior.

show abstract

“… 15. For this sort of view, see Ebels-Duggan (2010), Lister (2013) and Leland and Wietmarschen (2017). It may also have been Rawls’s view.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The ethics of asymmetric politics

Lovett

2022

Politics, Philosophy & Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Polarization often happens asymmetrically. One political actor radicalizes, and the results reverberate through the political system. This is how the deep divisions in contemporary American politics arose: the Republican Party radicalized. Republican officeholders began to use extreme legislative tactics. Republican voters became animated by contempt for their political rivals and by the defense of their own social superiority. The party as a whole launched a wide-ranging campaign of voter suppression and its members endorsed violence in the face of electoral defeat. This paper is about how such asymmetric polarization affects everyone else’s obligations. My core claim is that two kinds of relationship – civic friendship and non-subordination – underpin critical democratic norms. Republican misbehavior has severed cross-partisan civic friendships. Their authoritarianism forfeits their claim to non-subordination. The former means that non-Republicans need not justify policy on public grounds. The latter undercuts Republicans’ claim to enjoy minority vetoes when out of power and it gives their rivals reason to disobey the laws that Republicans make when they are in power. More generally, when one political actor contravenes the proper norms of democratic politics, their opposition is not bound by those norms.

show abstract

The Beginning of Community: Politics in the Face of Disagreement

Cited by 49 publications

References 0 publications

Public Reason Liberalism and Sex‐Neutral Marriage A Response to Francis J. Beckwith

Public Reason Liberalism and Sex‐Neutral Marriage A Response to Francis J. Beckwith

A Moral Defense of the ‘Moral Values’ Voter

The ethics of asymmetric politics

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About