The bear went over the mountain: Soviet tactics and tactical lessons learned during their war in Afghanistan part I

Grau, Lester W.

doi:10.1080/13518049408430161

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Югославская военная наука не могла обойти вниманием боевые действия советских войск в Афганистане против вооружённой оппозиции. Западных и нейтральных исследователей интересовала прежде всего тактика советских войск, а исследования, посвящённые партизанскому способу ведения военных действий, появлялись редко (Grau 1996;Jalali, Grau 1995;Etschmann 2003). (Brechtefeld 1996).…”

Section: партизанские и антипартизанские операции в югославской военн...unclassified

Lessons Learned by Yugoslav Military Experts from the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1979-1981

Timofeev

2023

Vestnik MGIMO-universiteta

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The article analyzes the attitude of Yugoslav military analysts to the deployment of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan in 1979–1981. Afghanistan was not among diplomatic, or military priorities for Yugoslavia. After the coup in Afghanistan on April 27, 1978, relations between the two countries, previously rather formal, deteriorated, as Kabul started to move away from the non-alignment movement taking a pro-Soviet orientation. Yugoslavia saw Afghanistan as a non-aligned country and was extremely concerned about the Soviet interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. This political assessment heavily influenced the views of Yugoslav military expert, resulting into some distorted conclusions and numerous overlooked lessons. This testifies to the primacy of everyday political (and even propaganda) needs over military science in Yugoslavia. They believed that Afghanistan would turn into a permanent problem for the USSR. Despite the rich empirical material, Yugoslav analysts did not see any novelty in tactics and the use of new weapons in mountainous areas. They neglected to analyze the tactics of anti-partisan actions in the highlands; their predictions were not original; they ignored the presence of militant fundamentalism as a factor in the conduct of hostilities.

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Section: партизанские и антипартизанские операции в югославской военн...unclassified

Lessons Learned by Yugoslav Military Experts from the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1979-1981

Timofeev

2023

Vestnik MGIMO-universiteta

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“…It was the start of 40 years of continuous war. Soviet military operations failed, at great human and material cost, contributing to the collapse of the Soviet Union (Braithwaite, 2012;Grau, 2014). History proves the point.…”

Section: The Environmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Did the Taliban Win?

King

2022

Armed Forces & Society

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On October 7, 2001, 3 weeks after 9/11, U.S. forces attacked Afghanistan; bombers struck Taliban headquarters and Al Qaeda training sites. By early December, the Taliban and Al Qaeda have been defeated and had fled. However, a war that began so successfully in 2001, eventually ended ignominiously on August 30, 2021, almost exactly 20 years later, with a U.S. withdrawal and a total Taliban victory. The speed of the Taliban’s triumph shocked everyone. The entire campaign, costing US$2.3 trillion and 2,488 U.S. lives, had failed—utterly. The United States had lost its longest-ever war. How is it possible to explain a defeat of that magnitude? This article seeks to address this question. Although numerous factors played a role, this article identifies three principal factors: the environment, the local politics, and the Taliban. Afghanistan is a very difficult place to conduct large-scale military operations. The West never came to terms with the local politics and consequently undermined their own efforts. Finally, although they were not militarily sophisticated, the Taliban were politically astute and very resilient.

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“…Of these, 525,000 were in the Soviet Armed Forces while another 90,000 were in the KGB, 5,000 were in the MVD and some 40,000 were Afghan army troops. 17 Soviet forces -the 40th Army, according to unclassified sources -were composed of the equivalent of five divisions, six separate regiments or assault brigades and close to 500 aircraft, including several squadrons of MiG-21s, MiG-23s and MiG-27 strike planes. They also inducted a few squadrons of Su-25s 'Frogfoot' attack aircraft -comprising the first deployment of this new ground attack aircraft in Afghanistan.…”

Section: Soviet Intervention In Afghanistanmentioning

confidence: 99%

Afghanistan: The decline of Soviet military strategy and political status

Hilali

1999

The Journal of Slavic Military Studies

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The bear went over the mountain: Soviet tactics and tactical lessons learned during their war in Afghanistan part I

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Lessons Learned by Yugoslav Military Experts from the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1979-1981

Lessons Learned by Yugoslav Military Experts from the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1979-1981

Why Did the Taliban Win?

Afghanistan: The decline of Soviet military strategy and political status

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