The Bayesian-Laplacian Brain

Chén

Romaya

2018

Preprint

Self Cite

Through our past studies of the neurobiology of beauty, we have come to divide aesthetic experiences into two broad categories: biological and artifactual. The aesthetic experience of biological beauty is dictated by inherited brain concepts, which are resistant to change even in spite of extensive experience. The experience of artifactual beauty on the other hand is determined by post-natally acquired concepts, which are modifiable throughout life by exposure to different experiences (Zeki, 2009). Hence, in terms of aesthetic rating, biological beauty (in which we include the experience of beautiful faces or human bodies) is characterized by less variability between individuals belonging to different ethnic origins and cultural backgrounds or the same individual at different times. Artifactual beauty (in which we include the aesthetic experience of human artifacts such as buildings and cars) is characterized by greater variability between individuals belonging to different ethnic and cultural groupings and by the same individual at different times. In this paper, we present results to show that the experience of mathematical beauty (Zeki et al 2014), even though it constitutes an extreme example of beauty that is dependent upon (mathematical) culture and learning, belongs to the biological category and obeys one of its characteristics, namely a lesser variability in terms of the aesthetic ratings given to mathematical formulae experienced as beautiful.

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Biological Basis of Mathematical Beauty

Chén

Romaya

2018

Preprint

Self Cite

“…That the ratio taking operation we describe above, or some other computational paradigm very similar to it, should lead to constant colour categories raises interesting questions from a Bayesian point of view [3]. Specifically, a colour category can never become a posterior; it is always a prior.…”

Section: Colour Categorization Is Dictated By Inherited Programmes Ormentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Certain characteristics facilitate the categorization of experiences or judgments as being based predominantly or even exclusively on biologically inherited concepts. Prominent among these is a lesser variability between subjects, even those belonging to different races and cultures, when making judgments based on inherited concepts [3]. The consequence of this more restricted variability is that the individual making a judgment based on inherited concepts is more entitled to assume that his or her judgment has universal validity and assent.…”

Section: Figure 5 Variability Of Colour Matching Responses For Each mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The former results in knowledge which, to a greater or lesser extent, is similar in all individuals, thus making it easy for one individual to assume that others would share the same or nearly identical experience under similar conditions; the latter, by contrast, lead to experiences and knowledge that can differ profoundly between individuals, even if experienced under similar conditions, making it unsafe for an individual to assume universal assent to his or her experience. In more general Bayesian terms, we consider the former, inherited, concepts to generate biological priors (β priors) which are similar, and resistant to modification through experience, in all individuals, of which one example is that of faces or human bodies; in the other category are artefactual priors (α priors) such as those of cars or other manufactured goods, which differ between individuals, are much more dependent upon culture and learning and are modifiable through experience [3].…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Biological Basis of the Experience of Constant Colour Categories

Javier

Mylonas

2018

Preprint

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In the work reported here, we used the Land Color Mondrian experiments to test the degree to which subjects vary in their perception of color categories. Twenty subjects of different ethnic and cultural backgrounds, for all but one of whom English was not the primary language, viewed 8 patches of different color in two Mondrian displays; each patch, when viewed, was made to reflect identical ratios of long, middle and short wave light. Subjects were asked to match the color of the viewed patch with that of the Munsell chip coming closest in color to that of the viewed patch, without using language. Overall, there was no variability in categorizing colors as red, yellow, brown and green but a small variability in categorizing them as purple, blue, orange and turquoise. In terms of hue, we found significantly less variability in matching warm hues than in cool ones. We interpret the lack of significant variability between subjects in the matches made as a pointer to similar computational mechanisms being employed in different subjects to perceive colors, thus permitting subjects to assume that their categorization of colors has universal agreement and assent.

“…We could of course have used terms like algorithm or program, which have found wide usage in computational neurobiology, rather than the term ‘concept’, to describe the brain's inherited ratio‐taking mechanisms for generating colours. We prefer to use the term ‘concept’ here for two reasons; partly because it perpetuates the term used initially by Immanuel Kant when he wrote that all experiences, except time and space, must be interfaced through concepts, and partly because, in the Bayesian context in which we write, there are other inherited ‘concepts’ which have cross‐cultural validity, such as that of ‘unity‐in‐love’, with which the term algorithm does not sit so easily and for which the term concept seems better suited (Zeki, ; Zeki & Chen, for a discussion of the Bayesian brain).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The biological basis of the experience and categorization of colour

Javier

Mylonas

2019

Eur J of Neuroscience

Self Cite

We used the Land Colour Mondrian experiments in a Bayesian context to test the degree to which subjects vary in categorizing the colour of different patches, when each patch is made to reflect light of the identical wavelength‐energy composition. The brain uses a ratio‐taking mechanism to determine the ratio of light of every waveband reflected from a surface and from its surrounds. Our (Bayesian) hypothesis was that this ratio‐taking mechanism is similar in all humans and therefore leads to a constant categorization of colours that differs little between them. The similarly categorized colours are the initial priors, with initial hues attached to them. Twenty subjects of different ethnic and cultural backgrounds, for all but one of whom English was not the primary language, viewed eight patches of different colour in two Mondrian displays; each patch, when viewed, was made to reflect identical ratios of long‐, middle‐ and short‐wave light. Subjects were asked to match the colour of the viewed patch with that of the Munsell chip coming closest in colour to that of the viewed patch, without using language. In terms of hue, there was less variability in matching warm hues than cool ones. In terms of colour categorization, there was little variability overall. We take the lack of significant variability between subjects in the matches made as a pointer to similar computational mechanisms being employed in different subjects to perceive colours, thus permitting them to assume that their categorization of colours has universal agreement and assent.