The Battle of Mons

Abstract

Der dcutsche Gcneralstab," it was rnerely iin cspedicnt ncccssitated by the inefficient communication esisting between the Armies and the German G.H.Q., which was at Luxemburg, far from the wing where thc decision was sought. On tlie evening of the aznd August, the First Army halted east of the line Mi nault-LnugrenCe (ISth Corps), Cliaussde Notre Dame de Louvignies-%horicourt (I IIrd Corps), Silly-Ollignics (117th Corps), Ninovc (IInd Corps). The IIlrd Reserve CorpS was detached towards Antwerp, while the IVth Reserve Corps had just arrived at Brussels. Army IIeadqunrters were at Hal. The IInd Cavalry Corps (three divisions), under Von der hlarwitz, was west of Ath ; it also was under the orders of the Second Army. It was only on this day (nznd August) that the First Army received any indication of the whereabouts of the British, and even tlien, the only definite inforniation was that an English squadron'had becn encountered at Cnsteau (five miles N.E. of Alons), that the hlons-CondC Canal was held from ;\Ions to Ville sur Thine, and that an English aviator, who had gone up at hlaubeuge, had been shot down. No doubt, various causes combined to produce this state of ignorance; the preconceived idea that tlie l3.E.F. was moving on Lille, the eficiency of the Uritish counter-espionage service, the short range of the aircraft of that period, and the fact of the IInd Cavalry Corps lleing placed under the Second Army, all contributed to it. The First Army was, however, according to our ideas, remarkably strong in divisional cavalry; the IIIrd, IVth and ISth Corps had sis squadrons should have espectcd it would be. As Von Kulil rcniarks in his i ook