This article explores recent literature on the often-overlooked Burma theatre of the Second World War. The brutal contest in Burma, which took place in the most hostile of climates, was never a priority for any of the belligerents in the global war. Despite this, a re-examination of the men who fought in the jungles, hills, and plains of Burma from myriad nations and cultures -and who bled and died in their thousands -adds a number of dimensions to our understanding of the war in the Far East. The twenty-first century has seen an expansion of the literature on the Burma theatre which has added both depth and colour to this truly unique arena of war. These contributions are invaluable in the realms of logistics, airpower, intelligence, politics, and soldiery. This fresh wave of literature includes the re-publication of certain first-hand examinations of some of the most disastrous moments in British military history; the longest fighting retreat conducted by the British Army; the reforging of that army into a victorious fighting force; and accounts of some of the greatest special operations units in history. Such accounts, in tandem with a number of recent scholarly monographs and edited volumes, argue strongly for the rediscovery of this 'forgotten' war.'Armies do not win wars by means of a few bodies of super-soldiers but by the average quality of their standard units. Anything, whatever short cuts to victory it may promise, which thus weakens the army spirit, is dangerous.' Field Marshal William Slim, 1 st Viscount Slim. 1 The war in the Burma theatre was occasioned by Japan's drive to displace the Western colonial empires with an organisation of states arranged, ostensibly, in the name of Pan-Asianism. 2 The Burma theatre was the only campaign in the Far East/Pacific War that lasted for the entire duration of the conflict but was nevertheless rated as a low priority theatre for both sides during the Second World War. It was a sign of waning British power that this was so. After all, the reconquest of the British colonies of Burma and Malaya were essential if Britain were to remain a first-rate power. 3 During the war, senior US figures nevertheless complained that imperial matters remained the British priority in the formulation of their policy. By contrast, the Americans held that their primary aims were to defeat Japan and to save China, 4 which had been fighting a full-scale war against Japan since 1937. 5 The policy priorities of the Roosevelt administration, were apparent to the Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek as he effectively resolved to hang on until the United States involved itself in the war against Japan. 6 This was perhaps not a policy totally unfounded in reality for, as Rana Mitter has noted, without Western assistance China may well have become a Japanese colony as early as 1938. 7 That is not to say that US policy on China was entirely logical. In 1995, Edward Dreyer criticised