The Basic Economics of Match Fixing in Sport Tournaments

Caruso, Raul

doi:10.1016/s0313-5926(09)50033-1

Cited by 18 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…In our analysis, we focused only on the temptation to lose, which is the result of a desire to meet the weaker opponent in the first round of the knockout phase. In practice, such temptation could also have different causes, see e.g., Caruso (2009); Andreff (2019). One of them is simply bribery.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anti-Tanking Pair Matching before an Elimination Phase of a Two-Phase Tournament

Stronka

2020

Economies

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Perverse incentives are ubiquitous in different economic settings. In sports, they often take the form of temptation to deliberately lose matches (the phenomenon known as tanking or sandbagging). In practice, there were even such pathological situations as when a soccer team intentionally scored an own goal. We show how and when the temptation is generated by the current pair matching method, the one applied after the first phase of many popular tournaments, including the most prestigious soccer championships. If the organizers of important sporting contests do not introduce any organizational innovations, they risk serious match-fixing scandals. We introduce an alternative procedure and show that its practical implementation could radically mitigate the risk. We perform a comparative analysis of the methods. We analyze the format “Winners and Runners-up Advancing from Two Adjacent Groups”, particularly its FIFA World Cup variant. In order to quantify the benefits of switching from the current method to the proposed one, we refer to simulation results. The expected decrease in temptation probability is about 83% and could be even about 90% if we additionally implement the suggested scheduling innovation.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anti-Tanking Pair Matching before an Elimination Phase of a Two-Phase Tournament

Stronka

2020

Economies

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“…2 This negative trend turned into declining percentages of stadium occupation and gate revenues, whereas according to Deloitte (2013), other European leagues show an opposite trend. As pointed out by Di Domizio (2007), Caruso (2009) and Buraimo et al (2012) several factors such as structural inadequacy of old stadiums, competing TV coverage, loss of credibility because of match-fixing and betting scandals, have contributed to this phenomenon. In addition, in Italy football is often perceived to be associated with a violent and risky environment because of hooliganism.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hooliganism and Demand for Football in Italy: Attendance and Counterviolence Policy Evaluation

Domizio

Caruso

2015

German Economic Review

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This paper empirically investigates the relationship between stadium attendance, hooliganism and counter-violence policy measures in Italian Serie A. In particular, this paper analyses the impact of counter-hooliganism policies adopted in 2007 on the quantity of game tickets sold. The counter-hooliganism measures, grounded on an entry card, namely a 'fidelity card', were designed to keep out hooligans from stadiums so favouring the attendance of either occasional spectators or uncommitted fans. According to our econometric investigation the expected substitution between committed fans and uncommitted fans did not take shape. In sum, the 'fidelity card' did not turn to be successful if evaluated on the average attendance perspective. © 2014 German Economic Association (Verein für Socialpolitik

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“…We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 3 For other recent studies related to match fixing in tennis, we refer to Caruso (2009) and Bag and Saha (2011) for theoretical approaches. Empirical studies are presented by Andreoli-Bersbach (2012), Brown and Minor (2014), and Rodenberg and Feustel (2014), for example.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Good Girl, Bad Boy? Evidence Consistent with Collusion in Professional Tennis

Jetter¹,

Walker

2017

Southern Economic Journal

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We identify professional tennis matches where one player competes for extraordinarily high payoffs while their opposition does not. Players “on the bubble” of direct qualification to upcoming Grand Slam events face substantially higher stakes than opponents, which presents an opportunity for collusion. Our findings produce evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis of unethical behavior taking place on the men's tour, as bubble players are 5.1 percentage points more likely to beat better ranked opponents than in comparable nonbubble matches. However, no such evidence emerges when analyzing women's tennis. We find additional support for the hypothesis of match‐fixing activities on the men's tour from analyzing the occurrence of tie‐breaks and the fact that our results become stronger once monetary incentives were increased after the 2013 season. Finally, the betting market does not predict this phenomenon, further confirming our suspicion of irregular activities.

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The Basic Economics of Match Fixing in Sport Tournaments

Cited by 18 publications

References 25 publications

Anti-Tanking Pair Matching before an Elimination Phase of a Two-Phase Tournament

Anti-Tanking Pair Matching before an Elimination Phase of a Two-Phase Tournament

Hooliganism and Demand for Football in Italy: Attendance and Counterviolence Policy Evaluation

Good Girl, Bad Boy? Evidence Consistent with Collusion in Professional Tennis

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