The Balkans: A Cold War Mystery

Westad, Odd Arne

doi:10.1057/978-1-137-43903-1_16

Cited by 3 publications

(11 citation statements)

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“…11 Diehl described enduring rivalries as "those in which two nations engage in at least three militarized disputes within a period of fifteen years." 12 Because different scholars use different thresholds to categorize rivalries, there has not been one universally accepted data set of rivalries: Bennett pointed to 63 enduring rivalries, 13 Maoz and Mor to 110, 14 and Klein, Goertz, and Diehl to 120 (in addition to 170 proto-rivalries, or shorter-term rivalries). 15 A history of conflict is an important indicator of future conflict, because the history demonstrates unresolved issues, willingness to fight, and ability to do so.…”

Section: Defining Strategic Rivalrymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…During the Cold War, it took the form of superpower advantage-seeking in the developing world rather than in the central theater of the confrontation, Europe. 13 A conscious choice to limit competition in this way can help stabilize a rivalry.…”

Section: Competition Only On Peripheral Issuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Odd Arne Westad told the history of the peripheral competition in The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 13 There was clearly competition in that central realm-the mutual buildup of military forces. But by the early 1960s, it was apparent to both sides that the scope for advantage-seeking was strictly limited in these areas of core national interests because of the risk of escalation.…”

Section: Communication Channelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…12 The British turned the offer down over concerns about the loss of diplomatic flexibility that such an arrangement would represent, including a potentially increased risk of conflict with France and Russia, and growing unease over the motives and trustworthiness of Bismarck. 13 The German Challenge, 1890-1904…”

Section: Policies and Perceptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Mao had originally proposed the formation of the Sino-Soviet alliance, fearing U.S. actions against the Chinese revolution. 13 Stalin's first reaction had been to decline the proposal, only to revisit it in January 1950 and sign the treaty the following month. Initially, Stalin had feared that, by signing an alliance treaty with Mao, the Soviet Union would lose some of the privileges it had received from the 1945 alliance treaty it had signed with the Kuomintang.…”

Section: Perceived Common Enemymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Stabilizing Great-Power Rivalries

Mazarr¹,

Charap²,

Casey³

et al. 2021

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This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of a project entitled Sustaining a Stable Strategic Competition with Near-Peer Competitors, sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, U.S. Army. The purpose of the project was to provide the Army an assessment of the emerging strategic competitions between the United States and both China and Russia, examine the approaches most likely to preserve long-term stability in these competitions, and draw implications for Army capabilities and posture.This research was conducted within RAND Arroyo Center's Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) sponsored by the United States Army.RAND operates under a "Federal-Wide Assurance" (FWA00003425) and complies with the Code of Federal Regulations for the Protection of Human Subjects Under United States Law (45 CFR 46), also known as "the Common Rule," as well as with the implementation guidance set forth in Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction 3216.02. As applicable, this compliance includes reviews and approvals by RAND's Institutional Review Board (the Human Subjects Protection Committee

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Section: Defining Strategic Rivalrymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Competition Only On Peripheral Issuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Communication Channelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Policies and Perceptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Perceived Common Enemymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Stabilizing Great-Power Rivalries

Mazarr¹,

Charap²,

Casey³

et al. 2021

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The United States, Differentiation, and Balkan Cooperation during the Cold War

Pedaliu¹

2022

Diplomacy in Southeastern Europe

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To reject it in favour of a deliberately evasive and opaque geographical term like Southeastern Europe, could promote the stereotypes it intends to avoid as well as ahistorical approaches to the study of the region and in the long run, historical amnesia. 5 II.The Legacy of WWII Liberation found Balkan societies deeply divided and seeking divergent political futures.Total war, collaboration, resistance and survival had become intertwined with pre-existing disputes and regional competition. Nazi Germany's and Fascist Italy's conquests were accompanied by energetic occupations through the "puppet" governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania and had created a combustible security environment. The Soviet Union's success in pushing Hitler' armies westward appealed to popular mood in the occupied Balkans more than the slower-moving Anglo-American strategy that aimed to divert Nazi Germany away from reinforcing the shores of France. 6 Allied "grand strategy" in the Balkans was experienced as a clamp that increased the ferocity of occupation, intensified disunity and bifurcated local resistance into communist and anti-communist groupings. It bred frustration and fostered suspicion. The cynicism evinced by the Stalin-Churchill percentages agreement in 1944 anticipated a future based on division. 7 It also revealed that American opposition to spheres of influence was flexible. In Athens, the December Events demonstrated that Britain, starved of the resources it needed to finance its postwar strategy, could resort to heavy-handedness to avert Communist takeovers. 8 In the Balkans, the shape of peace had

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Building Connectivity Infrastructures in the Cold War Balkans

Charokopos

2022

Southeast. Eur.

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The article explores the development of energy and transport networks in the Cold War Balkans by bringing three case studies of cross-border connectivity into focus: the Yougelexport project, the Djerdap hydropower station and the Circular Highway. In this endeavour networks are not treated as neutral physical infrastructures, but as social phenomena with political, cultural and economic impact. Hence, the development of cross-border and cross-bloc connectivity projects between the countries of the region is connected with the course of their bilateral relations and the broader political context of the Cold War. Against this background, the article discusses the national political objectives related to infrastructure building and the role of transnational technocratic cooperation in cross-border connectivity projects in the Cold War Balkans.

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The Balkans: A Cold War Mystery

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Stabilizing Great-Power Rivalries

Stabilizing Great-Power Rivalries

The United States, Differentiation, and Balkan Cooperation during the Cold War

Building Connectivity Infrastructures in the Cold War Balkans

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