2012
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-28756-5_19
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The AVANTSSAR Platform for the Automated Validation of Trust and Security of Service-Oriented Architectures

Abstract: International audienceThe AVANTSSAR Platform is an integrated toolset for the formal specification and automated validation of trust and security of service-oriented architectures and other applications in the Internet of Services. The platform supports application-level specification languages (such as BPMN and our custom languages) and features three validation backends (CL-AtSe, OFMC, and SATMC), which provide a range of complementary automated reasoning techniques (including service orchestration, composit… Show more

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Cited by 75 publications
(83 citation statements)
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References 28 publications
(28 reference statements)
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“…We reported the problem to OASIS which subsequently released an errata addressing the issue. 4 We also used SATMC at SAP as a back-end for security protocol analysis and testing (AVANTSSAR [1] and SPaCIoS [28]) to assist development teams in the design and development of the SAP NetWeaver SAML Single Sign-On (SAP NGSSO) and SAP OAuth 2.0 solutions. Overall, more than one hundred different protocol configurations and corresponding formal models have been analyzed, showing that both SAP NGSSO and SAP OAuth2 services are indeed well designed.…”
Section: Success Storiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…We reported the problem to OASIS which subsequently released an errata addressing the issue. 4 We also used SATMC at SAP as a back-end for security protocol analysis and testing (AVANTSSAR [1] and SPaCIoS [28]) to assist development teams in the design and development of the SAP NetWeaver SAML Single Sign-On (SAP NGSSO) and SAP OAuth 2.0 solutions. Overall, more than one hundred different protocol configurations and corresponding formal models have been analyzed, showing that both SAP NGSSO and SAP OAuth2 services are indeed well designed.…”
Section: Success Storiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…SATMC has been successfully applied in variety of application domains (namely, security protocols, security-sensitive business processes, and cryptographic APIs) and for different purposes (e.g., design-time security analysis and security testing). SATMC is integrated and used as a backend in a number of research prototypes (the AVISPA Tool [2], Tookan [18], the AVANTSSAR Platform [1], and the SPaCIoS Tool [28]) and industrial-strength tools (the Security Validator plugin for SAP NetWeaver BPM 1 ). The effectiveness of SATMC is witnessed by the key role it played in the discovery of:…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Pre-Processing and Verification AnBx → AnB → (verif ication) The AnBx protocol is lexed, parsed and then compiled to AnB [12], a format suitable for verification with the external tool OFMC [8], a state of the art model checker which is part of the AVISPA [25] and AVANTSSAR [9] platforms. The compiler can also read protocols directly in AnB .…”
Section: Architecture Of the Anbx Compilermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It not only allows reasoning about the high-level security property, abstracting from the low-level details of the cryptographic implementation, but it also helps to reduce the problem to a size that can be handled efficiently by automatic verification tools [7,8,9,10].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In particular, our notion of formats allows to integrate the particular way of structuring messages of real-world protocols like TLS, rather than academic toy implementations; at the same time, we can use a sound abstraction of these formats in the formal verification. We have implemented the low-level semantics in a translator that can generate both formal models in the input languages of popular security protocol analysis tools (e.g., Applied π calculus in the syntax of ProVerif [10] or ASLAN for AVANTSSAR [5]) and implementations in JavaScript for the execution environment of the FutureID project (www.futureid.eu). We have demonstrated practical feasibility with a number of major and minor case studies, including TLS and the EAC/PACE protocols used in the German eID card.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%