The Audit Committee Oversight Process*

Beasley, Mark S.; Carcello, Joseph V.; Hermanson, Dana R.; Neal, Terry L.

doi:10.1506/car.26.1.3

Cited by 648 publications

(650 citation statements)

References 50 publications

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“…The ACC wished to be kept informed of developments on a 'no surprises' principle, leaving the audit committee to play a more ceremonial role at the end of an interaction, 'reviewing' or 'approving' proposed solutions. This is consistent with Spira (1999) and Beasley et al (2009).…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 92%

“…16 In a quantitative interview study regarding the actions and behaviour of audit committee members, Beasley et al (2009) explore the audit committee oversight process in the post-SOX US setting by interviewing audit committee members, finding evidence of both substantive monitoring (consistent with agency theory) and ceremonial action (consistent with institutional theory and the earlier UK findings of Spira (1999)). Cohen et al (2010) interview Big Four US audit managers and partners to explore their experiences in interacting with management and audit committees.…”

Section: Audit Committee Processes Researchmentioning

confidence: 94%

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Auditor–Client Interactions in the ChangedUKRegulatory Environment – A Revised Grounded Theory Model

2014

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Audit and financial reporting quality are under intense scrutiny nationally and globally. The outcome of high-level auditor-auditee discussion and negotiation issues (auditorclient interactions) is central to this debate. Beattie et al. (2001) developed a grounded theory model of these interactions in the 1997 UK setting. This paper reports on a field study of 45 interactions in nine case companies in the radically changed post-SOX regulatory environment. Crucially, interviewees in each case company extend the chief financial officer -audit partner dyad to include the audit committee chair. Fundamental revisions to the model emerge. The strongest influence on interactions has become the national enforcement regime, overlaid upon the international standard-setting regime. The outcome in both the eyes of the participants and in our evaluation is full compliance (contrary to the findings from the 1997 setting), regardless of the perceived quality of the standards and the integrity of the outcome. Personal and company characteristics, which were of most importance in 1997, have become peripheral. The audit committee chair is shown to fulfil a gatekeeping role in relation to the full audit committee.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 92%

Section: Audit Committee Processes Researchmentioning

confidence: 94%

Auditor–Client Interactions in the ChangedUKRegulatory Environment – A Revised Grounded Theory Model

2014

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“…Присутност одбора за ревизију у организационој структури компанија је од виталног значаја за успостављање ефективног интерног надзора над процесом финансијског извјештавања. Прво, кроз активности надгледања процеса и рада интерних и екстерних надзорних механизама и давање препорука у правцу побољшања истих и друго, као модератор, који успоставља континуирану комуникацију између надзорних механизама, као и везу између одбора директора и надзорних механизама (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, & Neal, 2009).…”

Section: истраживање потврђује да компаније у банкарском сектору имајunclassified

Анализа ефективности одбора за ревизију у процесу надзора финансијског извјештавања на примјеру компанија у Црној Гори // Analysis of the effectiveness of the Аudit Committee in the financial reporting oversight process in montenegrin companies

Лаковић¹

2014

ACE

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“…In prior research, Kim, Segal, Segal, and Zang (2013) suggest that audit committee members may have more understanding on the consequence of management's opportunisms and failed financial reporting (such as share price decrease or bankruptcy). Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, and Neal (2009) suggest that investors can have more understanding on the firm by analyzing financial reports under audit committee's monitoring. Loukil (2014) suggests that audit committee members, such as independent directors with finance and accounting profession or frequent attendance members, may help accountants to be more confident with firm's accounting quality and to set lower auditing risk.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fair Value Information, Audit fees and Audit Committee in Taiwan

Wu¹,

Wu²,

Yang³

2017

IJFR

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Regulatory requirements to adopt IFRS and to disclose audit fees make it possible to examine association between audit fees and proportion of fair-valued assets among firms in Taiwan. A voluntary choice of adding audit committee in the firm for monitoring purpose also helps to examine the association further. Empirical results indicate that lower audit fees is related to higher proportion of (Level 2) fair-valued assets, a finding consistent to Goncharov et al.'s (2014) suggestion that firms pay lower audit fees with fair-value model than with cost model. Insignificant association is found for proportion of Level 3 fair-valued assets, which is similar to Glover et al. 's (2014) suggestion that firm's reluctant attitude in adopting Level 3 assets. Last of all, when audit committee is added, firm's audit fees is negatively associated with Level 1 and 2 fair-valued assets, implying audit committee's role of monitoring and further reducing audit risk and audit fees among Taiwanese firms.

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The Audit Committee Oversight Process*

Cited by 648 publications

References 50 publications

Auditor–Client Interactions in the ChangedUKRegulatory Environment – A Revised Grounded Theory Model

Auditor–Client Interactions in the ChangedUKRegulatory Environment – A Revised Grounded Theory Model

Fair Value Information, Audit fees and Audit Committee in Taiwan

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