The Attractiveness of Materials in Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycles for Various Proliferation and Theft Scenarios

Bathke, C.G.; Ebbinghaus, B B; Collins, Brian A.; Sleaford, B.; Hase, Kevin R.; Robel, Martin; Wallace, Richard K.; Bradley, K. S.; Ireland, John R.; Jarvinen, Gordon D.; Johnson, Michael W.; Prichard, Andrew W.; Smith, Brian

doi:10.13182/nt10-203

Cited by 56 publications

(53 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Hence by the time fuel has been cooled for four years, most of the "hot" isotopes have passed through four to >100 half-lives. Specific examples include [Bathke 2009], it is safe to assume that perhaps half or more of the spent fuel in the United States today is no longer self-protecting, utilizing the 100-rad/hr definition. Assuming the more realistic 500-rad/hr-dose rate, perhaps all of the fuel discharged prior to about 2004 or 2005 is no longer self-protecting.…”

Section: Discussion Of Self-protecting Fissile Materials From a Physimentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus, any device capable of generating a nuclear yield would meet the requirements of a sub-national group. A proliferant state is more likely to have preference for materials that are more easily and efficiently fabricated into higher and more reliable yield nuclear weapons than those materials of interest to a sub-national (terrorist) group [Bathke 2009]. …”

Section: Proliferation Resistance Overviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Pu, according to Bathke et al [Bathke 2009]. Adding addition Pu further reduces the attractiveness of the plutonium for use in nuclear weapons.…”

Section: Proliferation Resistance Overviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Proliferation Resistant Nuclear Reactor Fuel

Gray¹,

Moody²,

Bradley³

et al. 2011

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Section: Discussion Of Self-protecting Fissile Materials From a Physimentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Proliferation Resistance Overviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Proliferation Resistant Nuclear Reactor Fuel

Gray¹,

Moody²,

Bradley³

et al. 2011

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confidence: 99%

“…Depending on the sophistication of the design, almost all isotopic compositions of separated plutonium are potential weapons material. 29 A nuclear device can be made with less than 5 kg (0.005 t) of 239 Pu. 30 The use of fast reactors without breeding can signifi cantly reduce the inventories of plutonium and minor actinides in the fi nal waste stream, transmuting the actinides to shorter-lived radionuclides.…”

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confidence: 99%

Is nuclear fission a sustainable source of energy?

2012

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During this century, humankind must deal with increasing demand for energy and the growing impact of burning fossil fuels. Nuclear power, which presently produces 14% of global electricity, is a low-carbon-emissions alternative. However, the sustainability of nuclear power depends on the amounts of uranium and thorium available, the economics of their recovery from ore deposits, and the safety and security of nuclear materials. Unlike combustion of hydrocarbons, which determines the amount of fuel needed for a given amount of energy, nuclear reactions can create additional fi ssile isotopes. Hence, the choice of nuclear fuel cycle profoundly affects the size of the nuclear resource, as well as nuclear waste management and the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons. We argue that uranium resources, identifi ed and yet to be discovered, could sustain increases in nuclear power generation by a factor of two or three through the end of this century, even without advanced closed-fuel-cycle technologies. Uranium resource estimatesEvery two years, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development jointly publish global estimates of the uranium available in various categories of resources in the "Red Book" 4 ( Table I ), based on mining-company estimates. In 2009, ∼ 4000 kt of uranium was classifi ed as being in reasonably assured resources (RAR), for which there is direct geological evidence. Knowledge of existing deposits leads with high confi dence to the location and size of an additional 2300 kt in inferred resources (IR). Together, these two classes constitute identifi ed resources , and their distribution is shown in Figure 1 . The world's largest known deposit, Olympic Dam in South Australia, is estimated to have 1447 kt of uranium in RAR Whereas Canada and Australia have most of the present resources and active mines, Russia and Kazakhstan have the greatest potential for increased production. This map does not include information on either price or undiscovered resources. IR (2010). 6 Other deposits are much smaller, some having IR of 100-300 kt of uranium and many more with less than 100 kt.Beyond these identifi ed resources, the Red Book estimates an additional 10,400 kt of uranium in undiscovered resources. Extrapolations concerning the existence of these deposits are based on evidence in known uranium provinces where there is either some direct evidence ( prognosticated ) or similarities in geologic occurrence ( speculative ).In addition, there are unconventional sources of uranium, such as the tailings left behind at gold or uranium mines. Elevated uranium concentrations also occur in phosphate deposits and black shales. Uranium resources in phosphates are estimated to be more extensive than conventional uranium deposits. Extracting uranium as a byproduct of the production of phosphate-based fertilizers could yield up to roughly 10 kt per year, depending on the average ore concentration and world fertilizer demand. ...

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Nuclear non‐proliferation review and improving proliferation resistance assessment in the future

et al. 2020

Int J Energy Res

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Summary An increasing number of countries have taken nuclear energy as a preferred approach in response to the environment deterioration and energy supply deficit. The rapid expansion of nuclear technologies, however, would pose a great challenge to nuclear non‐proliferation, especially for the Generation IV nuclear reactor systems, which significantly differ from current nuclear fuel systems. This paper gives an overview of non‐proliferation research activities worldwide and outlines the existing problems, especially in non‐proliferation assessment. Because of numerous processes and various types of variables involved in nuclear fuel cycles (NFC), it is difficult to obtain a quantitative and objective assessment on non‐proliferation. In addition, the influences imposed by national nuclear policy on non‐proliferation have been rarely studied because of their large uncertainties, which may not precisely reflect the real non‐proliferation status in a specific country. In view of the above issues, we put forward an assessment framework by considering impact factors of national nuclear policy and by employing multi‐mathematical models to address some of the issues including subjectivity and uncertainties in the current assessment methodologies.

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The Attractiveness of Materials in Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycles for Various Proliferation and Theft Scenarios

Cited by 56 publications

References 6 publications

Proliferation Resistant Nuclear Reactor Fuel

Proliferation Resistant Nuclear Reactor Fuel

Is nuclear fission a sustainable source of energy?

Nuclear non‐proliferation review and improving proliferation resistance assessment in the future

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