The asymptotic strategyproofness of scoring and Condorcet consistent rules

Baharad, Eyal; Neeman, Zvika

doi:10.1007/s100580200077

Cited by 12 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…This theorem, in the spirit of [14,1], implies that manipulation may be a nonissue when the number of manipulators is small compared to the number of nonmanipulators: under almost any distribution on the votes (where the nonmanipulators vote independently), the manipulators can rarely even affect the outcome of the election.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some recent research in economics has independently recognized that when the fraction of manipulators is small, manipulation is rarely possible [14,1]. However, these papers consider only variations on the uniform distribution over possible elections; this is plausible from the economist's point of view, but in computer science we can preclude average-case hardness only by showing that the problem is average-case tractable under any distribution.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Average-case tractability of manipulation in voting via the fraction of manipulators

Procaccia

Rosenschein

2007

Proceedings of the 6th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

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Recent results have established that a variety of voting rules are computationally hard to manipulate in the worst-case; this arguably provides some guarantee of resistance to manipulation when the voters have bounded computational power. Nevertheless, it has become apparent that a truly dependable obstacle to manipulation can only be provided by voting rules that are average-case hard to manipulate.In this paper, we analytically demonstrate that, with respect to a wide range of distributions over votes, the coalitional manipulation problem can be decided with overwhelming probability of success by simply considering the ratio between the number of truthful and untruthful voters. Our results can be employed to significantly focus the search for that elusive average-case-hard-to-manipulate voting rule, but at the same time these results also strengthen the case against the existence of such a rule.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Average-case tractability of manipulation in voting via the fraction of manipulators

Procaccia

Rosenschein

2007

Proceedings of the 6th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

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“…Again, all of the existing results consider only the much smaller class of positional scoring rules. Specifically, Baharad and Neeman [1] showed that under some local correlation conditions, when the number of manipulators is no more than a constant, the probability that manipulation can be done is O(…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability

Xia

Conitzer

2008

Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

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We introduce a class of voting rules called generalized scoring rules. Under such a rule, each vote generates a vector of k scores, and the outcome of the voting rule is based only on the sum of these vectors-more specifically, only on the order (in terms of score) of the sum's components. This class is extremely general: we do not know of any commonly studied rule that is not a generalized scoring rule.We then study the coalitional manipulation problem for generalized scoring rules. We prove that under certain natural assumptions, if the number of manipulators is O(n p ) (for any p < 1 2), then the probability that a random profile is manipulable is O(n p− 1 2 ), where n is the number of voters. We also prove that under another set of natural assumptions, if the number of manipulators is Ω(n p ) (for any p > ) and o(n), then the probability that a random profile is manipulable (to any possible winner under the voting rule) is 1 − O(e −Ω(n 2p−1 ) ). We also show that common voting rules satisfy these conditions (for the uniform distribution). These results generalize earlier results by Procaccia and Rosenschein as well as even earlier results on the probability of an election being tied.

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“…This is a condorset [19] method which returns results in form of a ranking. The score for setting a ranking position is calculated from the number of wins in pairs minus the number of defeats [22].…”

Section: Copeland's Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…majority, condorcet winner, condorcet looser, etc.) [19]. Power emergencies How many power emergencies were sent to F&R.…”

Section: Distancementioning

confidence: 99%

Election Algorithms Applied to the Global Aggregation in Networks of Comparators

Sosnowski¹,

Pietruszka

Łazowy

2014

Annals of Computer Science and Information Systems

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Abstract-The paper shows the application of election algorithms in networks of comparators. We have described and adopted six election methods which have been used as an aggregator of partial results. We have performed experiments on the data gathered at the fire ground. All of them have been well described and results have been compared. The paper includes a discussion and interpretation of results obtained. It indicates the algorithm with the greatest potential to adapt and to obtain the best results.

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The asymptotic strategyproofness of scoring and Condorcet consistent rules

Cited by 12 publications

References 22 publications

Average-case tractability of manipulation in voting via the fraction of manipulators

Average-case tractability of manipulation in voting via the fraction of manipulators

Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability

Election Algorithms Applied to the Global Aggregation in Networks of Comparators

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