The asymmetric effects of 20 years of tariff reforms on Egyptian workers

Giovannetti, Giorgia; Marvasi, Enrico; Vivoli, Arianna

doi:10.1007/s40888-020-00199-0

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Furthermore, the authors argued that tariff protection could shelter farmers in developing countries from import surges when world food prices drop significantly. For all these reasons, many developing countries, including Egypt and Pakistan, oppose further agricultural trade liberalization as long as developed countries continue to provide large-scale subsidies and or do not reduce other nontariff barriers or continue to practice dumping (Margulis (2018) [33], Ejaz and Ahmad (2017) [34], Giovannetti et al [35], Spieman et al [36], Artuc et al, 2019 [37], Oliva M., 2000 [38], Ghandi and Zhou, 2014 [39]).…”

Section: Previous Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Food Trade Openness and Enhancement of Food Security—Partial Equilibrium Model Simulations for Selected Countries

2021

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This research measured the welfare impacts of food trade liberalization in India, Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) using the partial equilibrium model—World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS). Macroeconomic settings, domestic policy objectives, and food security indicator data are used to assess the implications of the simulations on food availability and stability. Simulation results for India, Egypt, and Pakistan indicate annual welfare gains (consumer surplus) of 2571, 340, and 25 million USD, respectively, while Saudi Arabia and the UAE have gains of 14 and 17 million USD. Results show that tariff elimination would have wide-ranging welfare impacts across food commodities within these countries. Moreover, reductions for specific commodities directly relevant to food energy and protein availability would have a greater direct impact on the poor. Lowering the highest tariffs on those commodities might raise the real incomes of more than 350 million persons by 7.5% or more and could create shifts in consumption towards more diversified and nutritionally sound diets.

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Section: Previous Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Food Trade Openness and Enhancement of Food Security—Partial Equilibrium Model Simulations for Selected Countries

2021

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“…However, there is empirical evidence suggesting a negative effect of import tariffs on labour income. Giovannetti et al (2021) show that tariff protection lowered real wages in Egypt. In line with that, Xu and Ouyang (2017) find that tariff reductions increased wages in China.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How unilateral tariffs harm workers under oligopoly

Rudsinske

2023

World Economy

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I study import tariffs in an asymmetric general oligopolistic equilibrium trade model. Their anti‐competitive effect reduces labour demand because firms want to shorten supply. Unilaterally increasing the import tariff raises domestic welfare at the foreign country's expense, but comes at the cost of favouring profit recipients as compared to workers, whose real wages fall. Only if initial tariffs are low, the tariff‐increasing government could use its rising tariff revenue to neutralise the distributional effect or the negative effect on workers. If supporting workers is the policy objective, tariffs do not appear to be a suitable tool under oligopoly.

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“…See, for example,Brander and Spencer (1984). The approach to transfer it to general oligopolistic equilibrium byColacicco (2012) is discussed later on in this section.4 In the GOLE context, this implies allowing the countries' marginal utilities of income to differ.5Giovannetti et al (2020) show that tariff protection lowered real wages in Egypt Xu and Ouyang (2017). find that tariff reductions increased wages in China.…”

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confidence: 99%

Essays on International Trade, Trade Barriers, and Oligopolistic Competition

Rudsinske¹

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Empirical evidence suggests both that market power increased considerably since (e.g. De Loecker et al., 2020 and that firms differ in destination-specific trade barriers (e.g. Munch and Nguyen, 2014). Motivated by these insights, this thesis develops a trade model that allows to analyze the effects of asymmetric policies in general oligopolistic equilibrium, uses this framework to study corporate taxation, tax-motivated transfer pricing and trade policy, and provides evidence that personal characteristics of top managers like nationality and gender can give rise to firm heterogeneity in destination-specific trade barriers.The first chapter develops a trade model with segmented markets that allows to analyze oligopolistic behavior across asymmetric countries. Firms' oligopolistic behavior has macro-level effects when countries are asymmetric. This can induce deviations from the law of one price, which gives rise to terms-of-trade based international shifts in consumption and welfare. Corporate taxation and taxmotivated transfer pricing are incorporated into this model in the second chapter. Without transfer pricing, a higher profit tax rate shifts welfare towards the taxing country. Tax-motivated transfer pricing introduces an additional incentive for all firms to export and, consequently, to expand production, such that real wages rise in both countries. As tax income shifts, consumption is relocated from the high-to the low-tax country. Import tariffs in this setting are studied in the third chapter. Their anti-competitive effect reduces labor demand as firms want to shorten supply. Unilaterally raising the import tariff increases domestic welfare at the foreign country's expense, but also favors profit incomes relative to labor incomes, as real wages fall.The fourth chapter shows a destination-specific pro-trade effect of top managers' nationality. The effect is especially pronounced for institutionally distant destinations, which can be seen as bridging the gap between institutionally dissimilar countries. Likewise, the effect is more pronounced for destinations with less developed institutions, which indicates that manager connections help overcoming trade barriers created by low institutional quality. Finally, the fifth chapter uncovers trade-reducing effects of institutional discrimination against female managers in destination markets. This barrier exists for firm internationalization on the micro and international trade on the macro level. Importantly, it might give rise to disadvantages for female managers even in non-discriminatory countries.

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The asymmetric effects of 20 years of tariff reforms on Egyptian workers

Cited by 4 publications

References 56 publications

Food Trade Openness and Enhancement of Food Security—Partial Equilibrium Model Simulations for Selected Countries

Food Trade Openness and Enhancement of Food Security—Partial Equilibrium Model Simulations for Selected Countries

How unilateral tariffs harm workers under oligopoly

Essays on International Trade, Trade Barriers, and Oligopolistic Competition

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