The artifactual mind: overcoming the ‘inside–outside’ dualism in the extended mind thesis and recognizing the technological dimension of cognition

Abstract

This paper explains why Clark's Extended Mind thesis is not capable of sufficiently grasping how and in what sense external objects and technical artifacts can become part of our human cognition. According to the author, this is because a pivotal distinction between inside and outside is preserved in the Extended Mind theorist's account of the relation between the human organism and the world of external objects and artifacts, a distinction which they proclaim to have overcome. Inspired by Charles S. Peirce's philosophy of mind, in particular, the author tries to find a way out of this 'inside-outside' fallacy. External objects, artifacts or processes should, according to him, not be conceived as inanimate and unintelligent matter utilised by a separately living, inner mental sphere that has set certain pre-established goals for itself. Mind has rather an artifactual character. It is not extended by an inner biological cognitive core but rather unfolds itself through objects and artifacts. Mind as such is, especially in our modern technological culture, shaped by virtue of and through technical artifacts. Recognizing this artifactual dimension of mind will, the author concludes, enable a more critical analysis of contemporary claims that ascribe certain original and irreducible features to thinking. Keywords Extended mind thesis (EMT) . Artifactual mind thesis (AMT) .Inside-outside . Introspection . Technology . Peirce "'My pencil is more intelligent than I', Einstein used to say."

Technological Environmentality: Conceptualizing Technology as a Mediating Milieu

“…Homes, offices, schools, parks, and cities have never been a neutral background in the process of human becoming: humans have created these supportive environments, but they have created humans too (Clark 2003). Within these bio-artifactual environments, humans have organized their everyday experiences, sustained their routines and bodily habits, as well as scaffolded their cognitive abilities (Aydin 2015). In this sense, many human capacities, cognitive and non-cognitive alike, have always depended on the fact that humans engineer their environment to support their activities (Laland et al 2000;Godfrey-Smith 2014).…”

The Posthuman as Hollow Idol: A Nietzschean Critique of Human Enhancement

“…The "over" in "Overhuman" designates detachment above all. Although the Nietzsche literature provides divergent answers to what exactly Nietzsche wants to overcome, a persistent motive that can be detected throughout his work is that he wants to overcome the Platonic-Christian worldview (Müller-Lauter, 1971;van Tongeren, 1989;Aydin, 2003). According to Nietzsche, Christianity has effectively rendered one possible interpretation of the human being absolute by subjecting him 5 to an unchanging moral value system that is sanctioned by an omnipotent and eternal God.…”

“…Also, unlike the Platonic-Christian influenced masses who desire dependence and life within an inclusive herd, Nietzsche's Overhuman stands in splendid solitude (Nietzsche, 2006, 46). According to Nietzsche, the potential to establish radical new ways of living can only come from individuals who are not completely absorbed and exhausted by society and its Sittlichkeit der Sitte and have enough distance and power to challenge it (Nietzsche, 2006, 36;Aydin, 2008).…”

The Internet as Idea

“…Here, a Filofax, a page of text, and the Internet are presupposed to be qualitatively similar external "parts of the world." While such a levelling may be useful for an approach centred on subjective cognitive processes (Menary 2006;Hurley 2010), the problem from a philosophy of technology perspective is that it ignores technologically relevant differences in value in a way that is symptomatic of Clark and Chalmers' "Extended Mind" approach more broadly (Kiran and Verbeek 2010;Aydin 2013): the fact that the artefacts considered are of incommensurate economic value, for example; or that they do not have the same sociological impact; or that they are entirely distinct as "archives," since information uploaded to the [390] Internet is networked, "greased" and open to multiple users in a way that information written in a Filofax is not (Moor 1997). …”

“…as symptomatic of a subjectivist tendency in philosophical treatments of technology (Aydin 2013). In relation to the Internet, it is possible to detect this in the so-called "neurological turn" in work by thinkers like Turkle, Lanier, and Bilton (Lovink 2010;Wong 2013).…”