The Antitrust Case Against Apple

Kotapati, Bapu; Mutungi, Simon; Newham, Melissa; Schroeder, Jeff; Shao, Shili; Wang, Melody

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3606073

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…Some of these examine 'selfpreferencing', which can occur where a platform owns a vertically integrated supplier. Cure et al (2022), Lee and Musolff (2021), and Kotapati et al (2020) provide empirical analyses of this situation. On the theory side, Aridor and Gonçalves (2022) study the conditions under which a self-preferencing platform is welfare improving.…”

Section: Existing Economics Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Recommender systems and supplier competition on platforms

2022

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Section: Existing Economics Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Recommender systems and supplier competition on platforms

2022

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“…193 Nonetheless, the practice in question could still amount to exclusionary conduct in terms of the raising rivals' cost paradigm. 194 By setting the cost of a critical input at a level that forces competitors to reduce their output or raise their prices, the excluding firm is able to harm consumers and gain supracompetitive profits. Arguably, this paradigm can prove helpful in assessing a broad range of exclusionary practices under the rule of reason analysis.…”

Section: A Assessment Under Antitrust Rulesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Platform and Device Neutrality Regime: The New Competition Rulebook for App Stores?

Borgogno

Colangelo

2022

The Antitrust Bulletin

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Among the numerous legislative initiatives implemented around the globe on digital platforms, some of these provisions are explicitly directed toward app stores. As they have all the distinctive features of multi-sided markets, app store owners represent the prototype of digital gatekeepers, controlling access to mobile ecosystems and competing with business users operating on the platforms. In light of the rule-setting and dual role of these gateway players, regulatory interventions are required in order to ensure that large app stores are treated like common carriers or public utilities, thereby imposing upon them a neutrality regime vis-à-vis new entrants. For the very same reasons, dominant app store providers have been subject to an increasing number of antitrust investigations attempting to ensure equal treatment and to avoid self-preferencing at the expense of rivals’ services. Against this background, the article investigates whether antitrust provisions are flexible enough to curb anticompetitive practices carried out by app stores and the extent to which regulatory interventions could, on the other hand, be necessary in order to address the seemingly unique features of the app economy.

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“…See European Commission (2020a) and European Commission (2020b).2 SeeNicas et al (2020) Kotapati et al (2020). summarise current antitrust arguments against Apple's conduct.3 Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (2019).…”

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confidence: 99%

Self‐Preferencing in Markets with Vertically Integrated Gatekeeper Platforms*

Padilla¹,

Perkins²,

Piccolo

2022

The J Industrial Economics

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The competitive strategies of 'gatekeeper' platforms are subject to enhanced scrutiny. For instance, Apple and Google are being accused of charging excessive access fees to app providers and privileging their own apps. Some have argued that such allegations make no economic sense when the platform's business model is to sell devices. In this paper, we build a model in which a gatekeeper device-seller facing potentially saturated demand for its device has the incentive and the ability to exclude from the market third-party suppliers of a service that consumers buy via its devices. Foreclosure is more likely if demand growth for the platform's devices is slow or negative, and can harm consumers if the device-seller's services are inferior to those offered by the third parties.

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The Antitrust Case Against Apple

Cited by 7 publications

References 0 publications

Recommender systems and supplier competition on platforms

Recommender systems and supplier competition on platforms

Platform and Device Neutrality Regime: The New Competition Rulebook for App Stores?

Self‐Preferencing in Markets with Vertically Integrated Gatekeeper Platforms*

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