The Anglo-German Naval Rivalry and Informal Arms Control, 1912-1914

Abstract

The last stage of the Anglo-German naval arms race before the First World War provides a valuable case study for the evaluation of current theories about the development of cooperation between intensely competitive states. After 1912 the naval competition between Britain and Germany resembled a game of prisoners' dilemma, as decision makers in both countries concluded that they benefitted from reciprocal restraint in battleship-building programs. Another striking feature of the naval rivalry in this period is that a modified version of a tit-for-tat strategy, devised by none other than Winston Churchill, who then served as first lord of Britain's Admiralty, played a critical role in controlling the competition. This essay analyzes the domestic political, diplomatic, and strategic factors that promoted mutual restraint in the battleship-building programs of Britain and Germany. Another purpose of this essay is to explore the limits of cooperation and to examine why this informal understanding on naval armaments did not lead to a significant improvement in Anglo-German relations.

Bargaining over power: when do shifts in power lead to war?

“…From 1912 to 1914, both powers came to the conclusion that mutual restraint in the naval arms race was in their mutual interests. This was not, however, a strategy to avoid war (especially on Germany's end), but rather a way to end the escalation in spending which Britain had made clear would be pointless by systematically matching Germany's investments (Maurer 1992). with Japan but also with Britain -so much so that some even stated that 'the relations between the two countries are beginning to assume the same character as that between England and Germany before the war '. 15 It is in this context that the United States called for a disarmament conference.…”

“…From 1912 to 1914, both powers came to the conclusion that mutual restraint in the naval arms race was in their mutual interests. This was not, however, a strategy to avoid war (especially on Germany's end), but rather a way to end the escalation in spending which Britain had made clear would be pointless by systematically matching Germany's investments (Maurer 1992).…”

The legacy of Admiral von Tirpitz: a geopolitical understanding of China's naval buildup through sea-denial strategies

“…This Anglo-German competition has been interpreted as an escalating 15-year contrast between the two countries (Kennedy, 1980). Britain promoted constant diplomatic attempts to decrease Anglo-German rivalry and foster arms control, including the discussions at the Hague Conference in 1907, the efforts during the summer of 1908 to initiate direct bilateral talks, the prolonged negotiations between 1909 and 1911, the Haldane mission of early 1912, Winston Churchill's pleas during 1912 and 1913 for a naval moratory, and final attempts by in the spring of 1914 (Maurer, 1992: 286; Maurer, 1997: 286). Although in 1906 and again in 1907, the Liberal government decided to cut the battleship-building program inherited from the outgoing Unionist government, not only did Germany refuse to reciprocate, but – apart from the proposal to promote tacit arms control in 1913 – the German government enlarged its shipbuilding program.…”

Analytic Narrative

“…In politics, international relations, military strategy, the new genre was predated by heuristic sketches rather than mathematical applications. Many of these sketches can be filled out, and it would seem arbitrary to keep them outside the door; see, e.g., Ferejohn (1991), Maurer (1992), Myerson (2004). Some topics have already gone through two stages of technicalities.…”