Abstract:Abstract. Uncertainty in a contract for some BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) projects may allow an opportunistic developer to take advantage of information asymmetrical factors, long-term external changes, and agency dilemma to request renegotiation and to alter the contact after it has been awarded. Such requests often entrap the government in hold-up problems and result in improper payments to the developers and may even create general public dissatisfaction with a project. In this paper, the Game Theory model … Show more
“…Game theory has been used to examine the conflict and cooperation between rational decision makers [32,33]. Game theory provides a useful approach to study the conceptual aspects of construction projects [34][35][36][37], and provides useful insights into the way that the participants utilize the resources under different situations. The grounded model can be used to simulate and analyze the effects of cooperative behavior on the stakeholders' net benefits, the overall project benefits, and the benefits' allocation strategy.…”
Considering the cooperative relationship between owners and contractors in sustainable construction projects, as well as the synergistic effects created by cooperative behaviors, a cooperative incentive model was developed using game theory. The model was formulated and analyzed under both non-moral hazard and moral hazard situations. Then, a numerical simulation and example were proposed to verify the conclusions derived from the model. The results showed that the synergistic effect increases the input intensity of one party's resource transfer into the increase of marginal utility of the other party, thus the owner and contractor are willing to enhance their levels of effort. One party's optimal benefit allocation coefficient is positively affected by its own output efficiency, and negatively affected by the other party's output efficiency. The effort level and expected benefits of the owner and contractor can be improved by enhancing the cooperative relationship between the two parties, as well as enhancing the net benefits of a sustainable construction project. The synergistic effect cannot lower the negative effect of moral hazard behaviors during the implementation of sustainable construction projects. Conversely, the higher levels of the cooperative relationship, the wider the gaps amongst the optimal values under both non-moral hazard and moral hazard situations for the levels of effort, expected benefits and net project benefits. Since few studies to date have emphasized the effects of cooperative relationship on sustainable construction projects, this study constructed a game-based incentive model to bridge the gaps. This study contributes significant theoretical and practical insights into the management of cooperation amongst stakeholders, and into the enhancement of the overall benefits of sustainable construction projects.
“…Game theory has been used to examine the conflict and cooperation between rational decision makers [32,33]. Game theory provides a useful approach to study the conceptual aspects of construction projects [34][35][36][37], and provides useful insights into the way that the participants utilize the resources under different situations. The grounded model can be used to simulate and analyze the effects of cooperative behavior on the stakeholders' net benefits, the overall project benefits, and the benefits' allocation strategy.…”
Considering the cooperative relationship between owners and contractors in sustainable construction projects, as well as the synergistic effects created by cooperative behaviors, a cooperative incentive model was developed using game theory. The model was formulated and analyzed under both non-moral hazard and moral hazard situations. Then, a numerical simulation and example were proposed to verify the conclusions derived from the model. The results showed that the synergistic effect increases the input intensity of one party's resource transfer into the increase of marginal utility of the other party, thus the owner and contractor are willing to enhance their levels of effort. One party's optimal benefit allocation coefficient is positively affected by its own output efficiency, and negatively affected by the other party's output efficiency. The effort level and expected benefits of the owner and contractor can be improved by enhancing the cooperative relationship between the two parties, as well as enhancing the net benefits of a sustainable construction project. The synergistic effect cannot lower the negative effect of moral hazard behaviors during the implementation of sustainable construction projects. Conversely, the higher levels of the cooperative relationship, the wider the gaps amongst the optimal values under both non-moral hazard and moral hazard situations for the levels of effort, expected benefits and net project benefits. Since few studies to date have emphasized the effects of cooperative relationship on sustainable construction projects, this study constructed a game-based incentive model to bridge the gaps. This study contributes significant theoretical and practical insights into the management of cooperation amongst stakeholders, and into the enhancement of the overall benefits of sustainable construction projects.
“…For instance, Yi and Lu (2010) use simulations to explain the impact of incentive fees on cost plus contracts, whereas Auriol and Picard () demonstrate that Build–Operate–Transfer (BOT) concessions increase as a function of information asymmetry. In another example of BOT projects, opportunistic developers are identified by Chen, Lin, and Wang () as taking advantage of government clients and causing hold‐up problems, forcing clients to renegotiate the original contracts.…”
Section: How Information Asymmetry Affects Construction Procurement Amentioning
■Building Information Modeling (BIM) systems are increasingly used in construction projects. Theoretically, these systems provide greater transparency and access to construction project information and, in doing so, should reduce the information asymmetry that commonly arises in construction contracting relationships. This typically occurs when suppliers of products and services opportunistically take advantage of the client due to the imbalance in information. The article therefore explores whether or not the high level of information content offered by BIM and the potential for sharing that information among contracting parties means that the information asymmetry can be alleviated using BIM. In order to investigate this, evidence was collected through three purposively sampled case studies of large principal organizations undertaking projects in Australia-each representing a different type of customer in the supply chain on construction projects. Our findings suggest a gap between the theoretical potential and practical application of BIM to reduce information asymmetry. The study found that, although BIM has the capability to reduce information asymmetry, it has not reached a mature enough stage in the Australian construction industry to clearly confirm that it actually reduces the problem. There is even a degree of evidence that, under certain circumstances, a reverse asymmetry may exist in which a client has the technical knowledge to more successfully analyze the BIM model (relative to the organizations they contract with) and then use the resulting information to their own opportunistic advantage.
“…Other researchers (Ho 2006;Tserng et al 2012Tserng et al , 2014Javed et al 2014;De Clerck, Demeulemeester 2016;Li et al 2017) used game theory to facilitate the condition of public-private partnership. Shen et al (2007), Chen et al (2012), Lv et al (2015) proposed recommendations to ease the bargaining process in BOT projects. Ho (2005) proposed a model for contractors, when the bid preparation is costly.…”
Abstract. Conflict between parties is a common issue in construction projects. In the present article, the conflicts between contractor and employer in delayed Design-Bid-Build projects have been studied. Defining a case study, a dispute resolution method has been proposed. This case has been considered as a MCDM problem. This problem has been assumed as a discrete zero-sum two-person matrix game with grey numbers. Among the four alternatives available for contractor and employer in the proposed case study, termination is the last alternative that decision makers choose. Based on different risk values, authors determined the optimal solution for both parties. This article integrates some linguistic criteria together with time and cost, providing the better conditions to avoid lengthy bargaining.
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