The Agenda Set by the EU Commission: The Result of Balanced or Biased Aggregation of Positions?

Abstract

Substantial theoretical and conceptual advances have been made with respect to agendasetting as a determinant for policy outcomes. An actor-centred perspective on frames and venues is core to this literature, structure as a single standing category has received less attention. In this paper we argue that these results should be combined with bureaucratic politics in the European Commission to further our understanding of agenda setting processes in the European Union.Typically, a legislative proposal of the Commission is produced by a lead department which collaborates with a number of other departments on a partly formalized basis before a joint Commission decision is taken. Different services hold different positions on specific policies. We show that structures and rules governing the process yield the potential for some positions to be systematically more strongly represented in the proposals entering interinstitutional decision-making. We complement our argument by providing evidence of interaction patterns when it comes to internal coordination.

Conceptualizing the European multilevel administrative order: capturing variation in the European administrative system

“…Moreover, Commission officials, also the seconded national experts, indicate a rather low degree of identification with their home governments and tend to have infrequent contact with their home administration (Murdoch and Trondal, 2013). Similar observations are made on position formation among permanent officials (Hartlapp et al , 2010) and on role perceptions among the College of Commissioners (Egeberg, 2006).…”

“…Peterson (2011) and Hartlapp et al (2010), suggest that this bureaucratic integration is mainly forged by the Commission SG. Integration within the Commission administration is also observed with regard to intra-service decision-making processes, the rise of a common 'culture' across DGs, and structured relationships between the Commission administration and outside actors -such as international organizations, EU agencies, and domestic agencies (see Hartlapp 2015;Kassim et al 2013;Muroch and Trondal 2013).…”

“…The contemporary internal integration of the Commission is centered on building organizational capacities around the President, partly by reforming the SG into an administrative service center at the disposal of the President (Kassim et al , 2013). Kassim et al (2013) and Hartlapp et al (2010, 2014), suggest that this bureaucratic integration is mainly forged by the Commission SG. Integration within the Commission administration is also observed with regard to intra-service decision-making processes, the rise of a common ‘culture’ across DGs, and structured relationships between the Commission administration and outside actors – such as international organizations, EU agencies, and domestic agencies (see Kassim et al , 2013; Murdoch and Trondal, 2013; Hartlapp, 2015).…”

Ulusal Çıkarların Avrupa Komisyonu Karar Alma Sürecine Sızması: Komisyonun Kabine Sistemine Rol Teorik bir Yaklaşım

“…Consulted DGs usually have to respond within four weeks and may express one of three opinions: a disapproving 'avis negative'; an agreement; or an agreement subject to certain comments. The agreement with comments is the most frequent response by DGs (Hartlapp et al 2010). If the response is an 'avis negative', the lead DG either takes back its proposal or and drafts a new text or the open points are handed up to the cabinet, in order for them to find a solution.…”

Constructing an internal market for research through sectoral and lateral strategies: layering, the European Commission and the fifth freedom

“…Interestingly, it seemed to have occurred without explicit political steering from Commission leadership (c.f. Hartlapp et al 2010). Could this be an outcome of interservice mobility (one element of the Commission's administrative reforms) at the policy officer level?…”