2009
DOI: 10.2478/v10103-009-0017-4
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The Agency Problem in the Merger of Vistula & Wólczanka Ltd. and W. Kruk Ltd.

Abstract: The article discusses the behavior of company bodies and possible conflicts of interests occurring among them during company takeover. In this context, the insider management model, popular in Poland, is discussed. Its implications have been presented using the example of the merger between Vistula & Wólczanka Ltd. and W. Kruk Ltd.

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“…The only other protective mechanism in existence was a company statute that gave Wojciech Kruk and his family the power to appoint two members of the supervisory board as long as they had at least 25 per cent of the share capital (Socha, 2009). The statute also granted Wojciech Kruk the power to appoint the head of the supervisory board for as long as his share stake did not fall below 10 per cent.…”
Section: The Case For the Defencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The only other protective mechanism in existence was a company statute that gave Wojciech Kruk and his family the power to appoint two members of the supervisory board as long as they had at least 25 per cent of the share capital (Socha, 2009). The statute also granted Wojciech Kruk the power to appoint the head of the supervisory board for as long as his share stake did not fall below 10 per cent.…”
Section: The Case For the Defencementioning
confidence: 99%