In the 1970s, an Islamic revival emerged in Egypt and many other Muslim-majority countries. At the time, the strength and success of this revival surprised observers who had assumed, first, that the secular emphasis of Arab socialism and nationalism after 1952 under Gamal Abd al-Nasser would remain dominant and, second, that the move to a secular public sphere was a natural part of the modernisation processes that had swept the globe over the preceding centuries. Forty years later, it is clear that neither of these assumptions was sound. The electoral success of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia after the Arab Uprisings of 2011 are among the most visible demonstrations of the importance of Islamic thought and practice in Middle Eastern politics, culture, and society, and the prominent role that many want it to play in ordering both public and private lives. Furthermore, the resurgence of Islamic revivalism in the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond since the 1970s demonstrates the central role of religion in many societies, cultures, and nations around the world, regardless of the advancement of secularism within the Christian communities of Europe. Explanations of Islamic revivalism that begin with the 1970s misunderstand the who, what, when, and why underlying the emergence of these movements, as well as wider histories of sociocultural and religious change in nineteenth-and twentieth-century Egypt. It is incorrect to assume that early Islamic revivalists were iconoclasts whose activities took place outside of institutions controlled by a secular state; that Islamic revivalism was a regressive, backward movement motivated solely by pursuit of political power or socioeconomic justice; that its origins lie in the 1970s or even between the first and second world wars; or that the goal of revivalism was to rid Egypt of all European influences. Viewing the political Islamists of 2011 in this light is an oversimplification that ignores the motivations of the founders of