Abstract:At first glance, it appears that the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights – the first pan-continental court of the African Union (AU) for human rights protection – epitomises the advances made by international courts in Africa in the past decade. Since its first judgment in 2009, the Court has taken a robust approach to its mandate and its docket is growing apace. However, a closer look at the overall context in which the Court operates reveals that it is susceptible to many of the patterns of resistance… Show more
“…These practices include out-of-court judicial diplomacy, where, for instance, the court directly lobbies Member States to accept a protocol to its constitutive treaty, to expand its jurisdiction or to extend access to the court. Judges of the ACtHPR, for example, frequently engage with heads of state and other high-level officials during ‘sensitisation’ missions to convince them to issue a special declaration allowing individuals and NGOs to access the court (Daly and Wiebusch, 2018). Similarly, the CCJ has sought to expand its appellate jurisdiction by a host of outreach activities (Caserta, 2016).…”
Section: Factors Influencing Resistance To Ics: a Roadmap For Empiricmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A number of other African ICs have also been facing resistance. This includes, for example, the East African Court of Justice (EACJ), which was reformed in the aftermath of a set of rulings on rule-of-law issues in its Member States (Gathii, 2016), or Rwanda's withdrawal from the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR) with regard to individual petitions or those from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Daly and Wiebusch, 2018). Global courts have also been subject to criticism.…”
The paper investigates and theorises different forms and patterns of resistance to international courts (ICs) and develops an analytical framework for explaining their variability. In order to make intelligible the resistance that many ICs are currently facing, the paper first unpacks the concept of resistance. It then introduces a key distinction between mere pushback from individual Member States or other actors, seeking to influence the future direction of a court's case-law, and actual backlash – a critique triggering significant institutional reform or even the dismantling of tribunals. On the basis on the proposed theoretical framework, the paper provides a roadmap for empirical studies of resistance to ICs, considering the key contextual factors necessary to take into account in such studies.
“…These practices include out-of-court judicial diplomacy, where, for instance, the court directly lobbies Member States to accept a protocol to its constitutive treaty, to expand its jurisdiction or to extend access to the court. Judges of the ACtHPR, for example, frequently engage with heads of state and other high-level officials during ‘sensitisation’ missions to convince them to issue a special declaration allowing individuals and NGOs to access the court (Daly and Wiebusch, 2018). Similarly, the CCJ has sought to expand its appellate jurisdiction by a host of outreach activities (Caserta, 2016).…”
Section: Factors Influencing Resistance To Ics: a Roadmap For Empiricmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A number of other African ICs have also been facing resistance. This includes, for example, the East African Court of Justice (EACJ), which was reformed in the aftermath of a set of rulings on rule-of-law issues in its Member States (Gathii, 2016), or Rwanda's withdrawal from the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR) with regard to individual petitions or those from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Daly and Wiebusch, 2018). Global courts have also been subject to criticism.…”
The paper investigates and theorises different forms and patterns of resistance to international courts (ICs) and develops an analytical framework for explaining their variability. In order to make intelligible the resistance that many ICs are currently facing, the paper first unpacks the concept of resistance. It then introduces a key distinction between mere pushback from individual Member States or other actors, seeking to influence the future direction of a court's case-law, and actual backlash – a critique triggering significant institutional reform or even the dismantling of tribunals. On the basis on the proposed theoretical framework, the paper provides a roadmap for empirical studies of resistance to ICs, considering the key contextual factors necessary to take into account in such studies.
“…Moreover, the findings could also be useful for the ACtHPR which has not yet developed a large case law, but which may come to play an important role in strengthening human rights protection on the African continent. The reception of some of the ACtHPR's first judgments by respondent states such as Tanzania suggests that compliance will be a difficult challenge also for this new IHRC (Daly and Wiebusch 2018). Finally, these insights may be relevant to domestic and international courts also outside the human rights sphere.…”
When embarking on this project, I was warned that writing a PhD dissertation would be a lonely process. My experience has been different. Throughout this project, I have benefited from the guidance, encouragement, and support from a long list of people. I have also been fortunate to be part of two excellent research environments at the University of Oslo, the Department of Political Science and PluriCourts. I also benefitted immensely from spending the spring of 2017 as a visiting researcher at the Department of Government at Georgetown University. First and foremost, I would like to thank my two dissertation advisors, Jon Hovi and Daniel Naurin, who have guided me through this project. Jon has been truly exceptional in his willingness to always take the time to read and offer detailed comments on any draft presented to him. Not only has his comments helped increase the clarity of the arguments presented in this dissertation, but he also deserves much credit for increasing the quality of the prose. Daniel has offered excellent advice both for sharpening the theoretical contributions and for increasing the relevance of the project to a broader judicial politics audience. Daniel also helped expand the empirical scope of the project to include the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (in addition to the European Court of Human Rights). Erik Voeten has been extraordinarily generous in offering both advice and support. The collaboration with Erik was crucial for the collection of data concerning the European Court of Human Rights. Erik has also offered thoughtful comments on the articles that make up this dissertation and hosted me during my stay as a visiting researcher at Georgetown University. I have also learned a lot from having Erik as a co-author on a paper that I have worked on as a side-project to this dissertation. I would like thank the Norwegian Research Council for support received through its Centres of Excellence funding scheme (project number 223274). A significant part of the work that has gone into this dissertation has involved data collection, which would not have been possible without the hard work of a small army of research assistants. I would therefore like to thank Dongpeng Xia, Ella Adler, Olja Busbaher, and Gianinna Romero who helped collect data iii concerning the implementation of European Court of Human Rights judgments, and Live Standal Bøyum who helped create the database of Inter-American Court of Human Rights judgments. A number of friends and colleagues have also provided invaluable feedback on the different parts of this project. In particular, I would like to thank Taylor
“…Nevertheless, if, for example, the ACtHPR's energetic seizure of its mandate (including enforcing the ACDEG) is not matched with a commensurate commitment by states to the idea of human rights and democracy protection, then political backlash against the ACtHPR may follow. 154 This backlash could range from (systematic) non-compliance with decisions, to a broad transnational coalition to dismantle the court. 155 Thirdly, conflict dynamics will influence the ability of states to implement the ACDEG.…”
This article traces a genealogy of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) and examines the charter's overall implementation. While there has always been a struggle between competing views of how to ensure more or less continental accountability for norms related to democratic governance in Africa, enforcement by the African Union (AU) has definitively become more robust since the ACDEG's adoption. The article argues that this development is observable in three trends: continental legalization, technocratization and judicialization of politics. It evaluates the growth of normative commitments in the field of democracy, elections and governance and their increasing consolidation into binding legal treaties; explores the increasing reliance on AU technical assistance in the implementation and interpretation of these instruments; and assesses the expanding role of continental and regional judicial bodies in enforcing commitments to democracy. Building upon a better understanding of these trends, the article identifies key contextual factors that will shape the ACDEG's future implementation.
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