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2018
DOI: 10.1017/s1744552318000083
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The African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights: mapping resistance against a young court

Abstract: At first glance, it appears that the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights – the first pan-continental court of the African Union (AU) for human rights protection – epitomises the advances made by international courts in Africa in the past decade. Since its first judgment in 2009, the Court has taken a robust approach to its mandate and its docket is growing apace. However, a closer look at the overall context in which the Court operates reveals that it is susceptible to many of the patterns of resistance… Show more

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Cited by 40 publications
(14 citation statements)
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References 17 publications
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“…These practices include out-of-court judicial diplomacy, where, for instance, the court directly lobbies Member States to accept a protocol to its constitutive treaty, to expand its jurisdiction or to extend access to the court. Judges of the ACtHPR, for example, frequently engage with heads of state and other high-level officials during ‘sensitisation’ missions to convince them to issue a special declaration allowing individuals and NGOs to access the court (Daly and Wiebusch, 2018). Similarly, the CCJ has sought to expand its appellate jurisdiction by a host of outreach activities (Caserta, 2016).…”
Section: Factors Influencing Resistance To Ics: a Roadmap For Empiricmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…These practices include out-of-court judicial diplomacy, where, for instance, the court directly lobbies Member States to accept a protocol to its constitutive treaty, to expand its jurisdiction or to extend access to the court. Judges of the ACtHPR, for example, frequently engage with heads of state and other high-level officials during ‘sensitisation’ missions to convince them to issue a special declaration allowing individuals and NGOs to access the court (Daly and Wiebusch, 2018). Similarly, the CCJ has sought to expand its appellate jurisdiction by a host of outreach activities (Caserta, 2016).…”
Section: Factors Influencing Resistance To Ics: a Roadmap For Empiricmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A number of other African ICs have also been facing resistance. This includes, for example, the East African Court of Justice (EACJ), which was reformed in the aftermath of a set of rulings on rule-of-law issues in its Member States (Gathii, 2016), or Rwanda's withdrawal from the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR) with regard to individual petitions or those from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Daly and Wiebusch, 2018). Global courts have also been subject to criticism.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Moreover, the findings could also be useful for the ACtHPR which has not yet developed a large case law, but which may come to play an important role in strengthening human rights protection on the African continent. The reception of some of the ACtHPR's first judgments by respondent states such as Tanzania suggests that compliance will be a difficult challenge also for this new IHRC (Daly and Wiebusch 2018). Finally, these insights may be relevant to domestic and international courts also outside the human rights sphere.…”
Section: Policy Implicationsmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Nevertheless, if, for example, the ACtHPR's energetic seizure of its mandate (including enforcing the ACDEG) is not matched with a commensurate commitment by states to the idea of human rights and democracy protection, then political backlash against the ACtHPR may follow. 154 This backlash could range from (systematic) non-compliance with decisions, to a broad transnational coalition to dismantle the court. 155 Thirdly, conflict dynamics will influence the ability of states to implement the ACDEG.…”
Section: Actor Dynamicsmentioning
confidence: 99%