The Affective Core of the Self: A Neuro-Archetypical Perspective on the Foundations of Human (and Animal) Subjectivity

Abstract

Psychologists usually considered the “Self” as an object of experience appearing when the individual perceives its existence within the conscious field. In accordance with such a view, the self-representing capacity of the human mind has been related to corticolimbic learning processes taking place within individual development. On the other hand, Carl Gustav Jung considered the Self as the core of our personality, in its conscious and unconscious aspects, as well as in its actual and potential forms. According to Jung, the Self originates from an inborn dynamic structure integrating the essential drives of our “brain–mind,” and leading both to instinctual behavioral actions and to archetypal psychological experiences. Interestingly, recent neuroethological studies indicate that our subjective identity rests on ancient neuropsychic processes that humans share with other animals as part of their inborn constitutional repertoire. Indeed, brain activity within subcortical midline structures (SCMSs) is intrinsically related to the emergence of prototypical affective states, that not only influence our behavior in a flexible way, but alter our conscious field, giving rise to specific feelings or moods, which constitute the first form of self-orientation in the world. Moreover, such affective dynamics play a central role in the organization of individual personality and in the evolution of all other (more sophisticated) psychological functions. Therefore, on the base of the convergence between contemporary cutting-edge scientific research and some psychological intuitions of Jung, we intend here to explore the first neuroevolutional layer of human mind, that we call the affective core of the Self.

Prospective organization of neonatal arm movements: A motor foundation of embodied agency, disrupted in premature birth

“…Our observation that neonatal arm movements are a basic, primary form of intended action has important bearing on understanding the development of agency and intentionality. It stands in agreement with a growing philosophical psychological account that basic, embodied intentions are part‐and‐parcel of the core sense of self (Alcaro, Carta, & Panksepp, 2017; Delafield‐Butt & Gangopadhyay, 2013; Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016; Fuchs & Koch, 2014; Gallagher, 2000, 2005; Hohwy, 2007; Merker, 2007; Northoff & Panksepp, 2008; Pacherie, 2008; Stern, 2010; Trevarthen & Delafield‐Butt, 2017; Zahavi, 2005, 2006). This non‐verbal modality of expressive gesture made in communication with a caring and attentive other underpins preverbal, embodied intersubjective communication important for psychological development and health (Delafield‐Butt & Trevarthen, 2015; Di Paolo & De Jaegher, 2015; Rochat & Gallese, 2016; Trevarthen et al., 2015) and, in cases where the infant's mental health or development is threatened, may require professional assistance to support (Brazelton, 2006).…”

Comments on the 2018 IAAP Conference on Archetype Theory: defending a non‐reductive biological approach

“…These complex, sophisticated and highly coordinated systems develop in a strongly convergent and conserved manner in the brain stem subcortical midline regions. Most importantly for our purposes, these systems correlate with similarly convergent psychological experiences of the emotions in question, as confirmed by direct stimulation studies in humans and other animals (Alcaro et al , p. 4; Panksepp ). Notably, these brain systems are not only universally convergent across all humans, they are convergent across all mammals with only minor variations, and they direct learning and adaptation to the subsequent environment; they are not created by specific environmental variations.…”

“…Interestingly, the comparison of affective neuroscience literature to Jungian psychology, which I began doing roughly a decade ago, has gained adherents, as noted by the presentation of Isabelle Meier, and other commentaters. Encouragingly, affective neuroscientists (Alcaro et al ) have in turn begun to take serious notice of Jung and subsequent Jungian literature, including that of Anthony Stevens () and myself. They assert that Jung’s foundational principles relating brain to psyche and archetype ‘were not only quite farsighted, but they actually open ways to connect his theory of the psyche with the most advanced scientific theories and discoveries of our day’ (Alcaro et al , p. 2).…”

Memory influences visual cognition across multiple functional states of interactive cortical dynamics

“…That feedback is key to phenomenological consciousness would make MUSI a higher-order theory of consciousness, and the ideas and evidence for MUSI are consistent with other challenges to first-order theories (H. C. Lau & Passingham, 2007;Ledoux & Brown, 2017). Nonetheless, within the domain of emotion, for which subcortical structures are necessary and have a core role, first-order theories are increasingly compelling and influential in mental health (Alcaro, Carta, & Panksepp, 2017;Panksepp & Biven, 2012) and in comprehensive theories of the brain basis of object cognition, memory, meaning, consciousness, self and embodied cognition (A. R. Damasio, 2010). Whether of cortical or subcortical origin, (a) feedback, reentrant, recursive and recurrent neuronal pathways and (b) synchronous ensembles of such neurons that are bound together for information processing (e.g., object features) have been proposed to be necessary for consciousness (A. R. Damasio, 2010).…”