The adaptive venue shopping framework: how emergent groups choose environmental policymaking venues

Abstract

Scholars have succeeded in producing several explanations for why groups choose to pursue their policymaking goals in different venues. A synthetic framework that explains the choices these groups make is developed through two case studies describing a conflict over the environmental problem of agricultural field burning. Emergent, boundedly rational, groups with a mission to clear the air of the pollutants associated with field burning, are found to be choosing venues by strategically assessing the institutional context. The particular institutional context that matters involves three primary elements: the group's mix of resources, opponents' resource strengths, and the degree of venue accessibility. These initial choices allow groups to generate new resources, to learn about which strategies do and do not work, and to change venues on the basis of their new resources and what they have learned.

Inside Lobbying on the Regulation of New Plant Breeding Techniques in the European Union: Determinants of Venue Choices

“…This study draws on the concept of venue shopping, which originally relates to advocates who face obstacles in certain decision settings and therefore look out for other ones, which they consider more promising for the promotion of their policy objectives (Baumgartner & Jones, , p. 36). Recently, scientific attention surrounding advocates’ decision to select certain venues has increased; scholars refer to this as venue choice (Huwyler et al, ; Ley, ; Ley & Weber, ; Marshall & Bernhagen, ). This study concentrates on the factors that influenced Cibus’ venue choices when this firm looked out for the most suitable decision settings for promoting NPBT deregulation in the EU multilevel system.…”

“…Our first interest is which venues Cibus chose for the promotion of the unpopular issue of NPBT deregulation in the EU, whose multilevel polity provides advocates with multiple channels and targets for lobbying their objectives (Beyers & Kerremans, ; Princen & Kerremans, ). Second, we are interested in the factors which explain Cibus’ venue choices because previous research has revealed various venue‐internal and ‐external factors accounting for advocates’ choices of venues (see e.g., Buffardi, Pekkanen, & Smith, ; Holyoke, Brown, & Henig, ; Ley, ; Ley & Weber, ; Marshall & Bernhagen, ; Pralle, ).…”

Claiming geothermal water: Critical legal geography and the scalar politics of hot spring development in China

“…5.2 | "Venue shopping" for contested laws and regulations: The grabbing of geothermal water by local government Under the context of controversial laws and regulations, a general strategy adopted by local government is "venue shopping" between the two sets of law and policy venues to incorporate its own land development interests. "Venue shopping" is defined by Guiraudon (2000, p. 252) as "political actors seek[ing] policy venues where the balance of forces is tipped in their favor," and the strategy has been highlighted in contemporary environmental politics (Ley & Weber, 2015;Pralle, 2003). The venue "shopped" by local government in this case is the classification of geothermal water as a water resource.…”

Second‐Order Devolution or Local Activism? Local Air Agencies Revisited

“…However, this also provides advocacy groups with more opportunities to influence policy (Woods & Potoski, ). In recent years, environmental advocacy groups have become more adept at strategically targeting access points to policy makers at both state and local levels to become more influential in policy choices (Davis & Hoffer, ; Holyoke, Brown, & Henig, ; Ley & Weber, ). Industry groups have followed a similar pattern and identified venues in regulatory processes that allow them to minimize the influence of opposition groups (Davis & Hoffer, ; Shipan & Volden, , ).…”

“…Although advocacy groups tend to specialization in certain areas, venue shopping occurs across both legislative and bureaucratic domains (Buffardi, Pekkanen, & Smith, ; Holyoke et al, ; Ley & Weber, ). In addition to more conventional lobbying of legislators, advocacy groups can also influence administrative agencies by lobbying their rule‐making processes, interpretations of legislation, or enforcement actions, which can substantively alter environmental regulations in practice (Furlong & Kerwin, ; Kochtcheeva, ).…”