Prior empirical work in semantic development has produced an impressive finding showing that children can reliably detect a modal's relative force (e.g. that must is stronger sounding than may) by five-anda-half years of age. We investigate the extent to which a representation of relative force can account for an understanding of epistemic modals when their logical meaning is considered (i.e. when modals are interpretable as expressions of necessary and possible conclusions). Experiment 1 presents a replication of Hirst & Weil's hidden-object task, which originally included the supremely forceful indicative is. Thirtytwo five-year-olds were required to find a peanut hidden under one of two containers based on a pair of statements that contrasted is with has to, has to with might, or is with might. Half the children were entitled to search for the peanut upon hearing the two statements and half were required to indicate only where they would look. Results largely