The acquired language of thought hypothesis: A theory of symbol grounding

Viger, Christopher

doi:10.1075/bct.21.07vig

Cited by 4 publications

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“…In humans too sensorimotor action drives a self-produced capacity to perceive normative signals. Indeed, Viger (2007) argues that a history of cognitive integration gives rise to the truth preserving properties of forms (or symbols). Second, iconic and indexical co-ordination enables a robot to act in ways that we deem 'symbolic'.…”

Section: Human-robot Languagementioning

confidence: 99%

Robots – the new linguistic informants?

Cowley

2008

Connection Science

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Section: Human-robot Languagementioning

confidence: 99%

Robots – the new linguistic informants?

Cowley

2008

Connection Science

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“…On some views of concepts, cat represents the full‐fledged property of being a cat (Fodor , Millikan ). On other views, cat represents, at least in the first instance, the word “cat” and/or cat‐related perceptual imagery (Prinz , Viger ). On still other views, cat represents a prototype (Rosch , Rosch and Mervis ), set of exemplars (Medin and Schaffer , Brooks ), or a role in a theory of cats (Murphy and Medin , Carey , Gopnik and Wellman ).…”

Section: Intentionalism About Moodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intentionalism about Moods

Mendelovici

2013

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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According to intentionalism, phenomenal properties are identical to, supervenient on, or determined by representational properties. Intentionalism faces a special challenge when it comes to accounting for the phenomenal character of moods. First, it seems that no intentionalist treatment of moods can capture their apparently undirected phenomenology.Second, it seems that even if we can come up with a viable intentionalist account of moods, we would not be able to motivate it in some of the same kinds of ways that intentionalism about other kinds of states can be motivated. In this paper, I respond to both challenges: First, I propose a novel intentionalist treatment of moods on which they represent unbound affective properties. Then, I argue that this view is indirectly supported by the same kinds of considerations that directly support intentionalism about other mental states.

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“…Indeed, it is likely that developed forms of self-regulation use word-infected symbols as the basis for new powers of verbal imagination. This, moreover, fits Viger's (2007) appeal to an acquired language of thought. In contrast to the claims of code models, human language is grounded in the use of an emergent grasp of situations to control vocalisations.…”

Section: Beyond the Symbol Grounding Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

How human infants deal with symbol grounding

Cowley

2007

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Taking a distributed view of language, this paper naturalizes symbol grounding.Learning to talk is traced to -not categorizing speech sounds -but events that shape the rise of human-style autonomy. On the extended symbol hypothesis, this happens as babies integrate micro-activity with slow and deliberate adult action. As they discover social norms, intrinsic motive formation enables them to reshape co-action. Because infants link affect to contingencies, dyads develop norm-referenced routines. Over time, infant doings become analysis amenable. The caregiver of a nine-month-old may, for example, prompt the baby to fetch objects. Once she concludes that the baby uses 'words' to understand what she says, the infant can use this belief in orienting to more abstract contingencies. New cognitive powers will develop as the baby learns to act in ways that are consistent with a caregiver's false belief that her baby uses 'words.'

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The acquired language of thought hypothesis: A theory of symbol grounding

Cited by 4 publications

References 0 publications

Robots – the new linguistic informants?

Robots – the new linguistic informants?

Intentionalism about Moods

How human infants deal with symbol grounding

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