The Accuracy of Microtargeted Policy Positions

Abstract

Identifying voters who share policy positions with the candidates has become an important component of modern political campaigns as they rely on microtargeted estimates to guide targeting decisions. Using survey data and microtargeted estimates from the 2012 election, I conduct one of the fi rst independent examinations of the accuracy of microtargeting. The estimates are the most accurate in Florida, a state that requests information on the race of voters when they register and has party registration. The estimates are less accurate in the other battleground states that do not collect as much information. The accuracy rates range from 36% to 82% depending on the issue and state.

The Minimal Persuasive Effects of Campaign Contact in General Elections: Evidence from 49 Field Experiments

“…Moreover, abortion is widely regarded as “easy” and important for many voters. Finally, the interest group had funded a pre-survey to identify supporters of its issue, purging individuals from the target universe for the mailers who were anti-abortion and who might have had a negative reaction to the mailers—a strategy that cannot be widely applied because most voters do not answer surveys and cannot be identified for individual targeting of this type without individual voter survey responses (Endres 2016; Hersh 2015). We would expect persuasion to be possible in such conditions, but we expect such conditions to be extremely rare.…”

“…Several aspects of this situation are quite unique. This same strategy would not have been possible in states where campaigns do not have access to voter race on voter rolls (Endres 2016; Hersh 2015). In addition, only by conducting an expensive randomized experiment far in advance was the group able to identify the right audience for its message—and only by conducting door-to-door canvassing was it able to limit its message to only this audience (whereas with TV ads, this individual-level targeting would not have been possible).…”

“…In summary, although these three studies suggest that persuasion close to election day is possible sometimes, the broader context of these experiments and the substantively small effects they estimated underscore our broader pessimism that meaningful persuasion is possible for most campaigns close to most general elections 28 . These studies were all conducted in unusual electoral circumstances and among a subset of voters that most campaigns do not have the resources to identify, using data that most campaigns cannot even collect (Endres 2016; Hersh 2015). 29…”

“…In the existing literature and in our original studies, we also find that campaigns appear able to have persuasive effects in circumstances in which candidates take unusually unpopular positions and opposing campaigns invest unusually heavily in identifying persuadable, cross-pressured voters whom they can inform about these positions (Hersh and Schaffner 2013; Rogers and Nickerson 2013). In these cases, identifying cross-pressured persuadable voters requires much more effort than simply applying much-ballyhooed “big data” (Endres 2016; Hersh 2015). For example, the organization we partnered with on our original studies conducted large-scale field experiments early in the electoral cycle in several states to identify subgroups of persuadable voters that were difficult to predict ex ante.…”

Targeted Issue Messages and Voting Behavior

“…In theory, this should be a successful strategy when campaigns are contacting voters with shared issue messages. However, narrowly targeting policy appeals is potentially risky when they include divisive and polarizing topics, commonly referred to as “wedge” issues (Hillygus & Shields, 2008; Wiant, 2002), especially in light of the challenges campaigns face forecasting where individuals positions themselves on policy issues (Endres, 2016). 1 When campaigns rely on sometimes faulty policy predictions, some individuals will encounter campaign content highlighting issue(s) in which the recipient and the candidate share the same position, and they may behave as theorized by voting for the candidate who targeted them.…”