In case you haven't received the news, the phenomenal intentionality research program is under way. It was both recognized and catalyzed as such by Uriah Kriegel in his introduction to the (2013) edited volume Phenomenal Intentionality. Before that, it had been coalescing for over a decadeeven longer if the work of John Searle (1992) and Galen Strawson (1994) in the early 1990s counts. Charles Siewert's (1998) book The Significance of Consciousness helped make respectable the idea, long out of favor, that consciousness and intentionality are bound up with one another. It would be hard to overstate the influence of Horgan and Tienson's (2002) paper "The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality." (A fellow phenomenal-intentionality sympathizer who heard the paper when it was first presented told me that her reaction was one of dizzy elation. She thought, "Really? We get to say things like that?") Brian Loar, David Pitt, and David Chalmers also contributed seminal papers right around the same time. 1 These early contributions paved the way for a flurry of work in the past ten years, comprising two volumes of new essays, 2 themed journal issues in The Monist (2008) and Phenomenology and Mind (2016), numerous journal articles, andso farthree monographs. 3 The most recent is The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality by Angela Mendelovici. 4 Thomas Kuhn wrote in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions that the early development of a scientific research program (a 'paradigm,' in his jargon) is marked by the publication of books written for a broadly educated readership, whereas a more mature research program proceeds by the working out of puzzles in journal articles directed at other specialists. The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality is an excellent example of the sort of paradigmestablishing monograph that Kuhn had in mind. Up until now, most work on phenomenal intentionality has sought to establish either the existence or the scope of phenomenallybased intentionality. Mendelovici contributes to these discussions, but she proceeds much further, providing a positive theory of the metaphysics of all intentionality in terms of consciousness. Mendelovici makes it clear when she is making claims that are accepted by all or most members of the phenomenal-intentionality crowd and when her claims are more parochial. This allows the book to serve both as a primer and as a cutting-edge proposal. It is and shall be essential reading for those interested in the phenomenal-intentionality paradigm. Certainly, it raises many puzzles, some of which I discuss below. But these are the sorts of puzzles that galvanize rather than paralyze. Would-be puzzle-solvers within the paradigm can now get to work: The research program has been thoroughly launched.