The Access Problem

Montague, Michelle

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.003.0002

Cited by 18 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…Resemblance also fits neatly with Michelle Montague's (2013) ‘matching’ view. Montague argues that we achieve perceptual access to a material object when we represent enough of its properties.…”

Section: Representation As Resemblancesupporting

confidence: 61%

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Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Representation

Ott¹

2016

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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ABSTRACT:According to the phenomenal intentionality research program, a state's intentional content is fixed by its phenomenal character. Defenders of this view have little to say about just how this grounding is accomplished. I argue that without a robust account of representation, the research program promises too little. Unfortunately, most of the well-developed accounts of representation—asymmetric dependence, teleosemantics, and the like—ground representation in external relations such as causation. Such accounts are inconsistent with the core of the phenomenal intentionality program. I argue that, however counterintuitive it may seem, the best prospect for explaining how phenomenal character represents is an appeal to resemblance.

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Section: Representation As Resemblancesupporting

confidence: 61%

“…But now suppose Jane's experience is as of a pink elephant (to borrow Montague's example [2013: 39]). Now none of the qualities instantiated in her experience resembles the qualities of the boulder.…”

Section: A Defense Of the Resemblance-based Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Representation

Ott¹

2016

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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“…28. Montague (2013) and Ott (2016) both develop views which are similar to Mendelovici's matching view. Neither draw explicit connections to our medieval philosophical heritage, however.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 83%

Primer, proposal, and paradigm: A review essay of Mendelovici’sThe Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality

Woodward

2019

Philosophical Psychology

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In case you haven't received the news, the phenomenal intentionality research program is under way. It was both recognized and catalyzed as such by Uriah Kriegel in his introduction to the (2013) edited volume Phenomenal Intentionality. Before that, it had been coalescing for over a decadeeven longer if the work of John Searle (1992) and Galen Strawson (1994) in the early 1990s counts. Charles Siewert's (1998) book The Significance of Consciousness helped make respectable the idea, long out of favor, that consciousness and intentionality are bound up with one another. It would be hard to overstate the influence of Horgan and Tienson's (2002) paper "The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality." (A fellow phenomenal-intentionality sympathizer who heard the paper when it was first presented told me that her reaction was one of dizzy elation. She thought, "Really? We get to say things like that?") Brian Loar, David Pitt, and David Chalmers also contributed seminal papers right around the same time. 1 These early contributions paved the way for a flurry of work in the past ten years, comprising two volumes of new essays, 2 themed journal issues in The Monist (2008) and Phenomenology and Mind (2016), numerous journal articles, andso farthree monographs. 3 The most recent is The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality by Angela Mendelovici. 4 Thomas Kuhn wrote in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions that the early development of a scientific research program (a 'paradigm,' in his jargon) is marked by the publication of books written for a broadly educated readership, whereas a more mature research program proceeds by the working out of puzzles in journal articles directed at other specialists. The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality is an excellent example of the sort of paradigmestablishing monograph that Kuhn had in mind. Up until now, most work on phenomenal intentionality has sought to establish either the existence or the scope of phenomenallybased intentionality. Mendelovici contributes to these discussions, but she proceeds much further, providing a positive theory of the metaphysics of all intentionality in terms of consciousness. Mendelovici makes it clear when she is making claims that are accepted by all or most members of the phenomenal-intentionality crowd and when her claims are more parochial. This allows the book to serve both as a primer and as a cutting-edge proposal. It is and shall be essential reading for those interested in the phenomenal-intentionality paradigm. Certainly, it raises many puzzles, some of which I discuss below. But these are the sorts of puzzles that galvanize rather than paralyze. Would-be puzzle-solvers within the paradigm can now get to work: The research program has been thoroughly launched.

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“…11 Michelle Montague calls the task of answering the primary question of intentionality the access problem. See Montague (2013). Although I disagree with the conclusion of her paper, I benefited greatly from reading it.…”

Section: Two Views Of Intentionalitymentioning

confidence: 89%

Intentionality and Realism

Fiocco

2015

Acta Anal

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In this paper, I argue that how a mind can come to be about an object and how the world is independently of the workings of any mind are inextricably linked. Hence, epistemology, at its most basic, and metaphysics are systematically related. In order to demonstrate the primary thesis of the paper, I first articulate two contrary accounts of the nature of reality and then two contradictory general views of intentionality. I argue that these positions can be combined in only two ways. This argument turns on the impossibility of there being an object that cannot, in principle, be thought of or referred to, so I present reasons for thinking such a thing cannot exist. The upshot is that there are but two intentional-cum-ontological positions, that is, two unified positions regarding how a mind relates to the world and what the world is like in itself. This might be surprising, for one might have thought that the views in the different domains were independent; it is significant, because it shows that views that might have seemed related by mere affinity are, in fact, necessarily conjoined. I conclude by presenting reasons for thinking one of the two intentional-cum-ontological positions is untenable.

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The Access Problem

Cited by 18 publications

References 3 publications

Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Representation

Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Representation

Primer, proposal, and paradigm: A review essay of Mendelovici’sThe Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality

Intentionality and Realism

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