1993
DOI: 10.2307/2167064
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The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954-1955: Contingency, Luck, Deterrence?

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Cited by 31 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…The non-use of nuclear weapons since 1945 is a defining feature of the nuclear age (Sagan 2004;Tannenwald 2007;Paul 2009;Walker 2010;Gavin 2015;Smetana 2019). It is expected that states would not use nuclear weapons in the same manner as "you would use a bullet or anything else," to quote President Dwight Eisenhower (Chang andDi 1993, 1519).…”
Section: Taboo or Something Else?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The non-use of nuclear weapons since 1945 is a defining feature of the nuclear age (Sagan 2004;Tannenwald 2007;Paul 2009;Walker 2010;Gavin 2015;Smetana 2019). It is expected that states would not use nuclear weapons in the same manner as "you would use a bullet or anything else," to quote President Dwight Eisenhower (Chang andDi 1993, 1519).…”
Section: Taboo or Something Else?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Fourteen million people died, indirectly or directly, as a result of the previous Cold War (Chamberlin 2018 ). On numerous occasions, the Cold War almost ended in nuclear holocaust (Chang and He 1993 ; Pelopidas 2017 ; Downing 2018 ). Statistical analysis indicates that Great Power war was as much avoided by chance as contrivance (Braumoeller 2019 ).…”
Section: Three Species Of Nationalism In the Contemporary Indo-pacificmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Yet, even when the Chinese communists scorned the Nationalists for embracing American support, Washington remained purposefully ambiguous about whether Jinmen and Matsu fell under the provisions of its security alliance with Taiwan. Dulles said that the American strategy was primarily about “deterrence through uncertainty” as keeping PRC leaders in the fog about US intentions was designed to induce self-restraint on their part (Chang and Di, 1993: 1511). The strategy clearly backfired, however, as this uncertainty emboldened the Chinese communists on 18 January 1955 to take the Dachens, another group of offshore islands under Nationalist control.…”
Section: China’s Dealing With Disputed Islands: Two Historical Examplesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the Spring of 1955, the region saw a massive increase in the US military presence. At this point, Eisenhower even believed an invasion of Taiwan was imminent, calling the Chinese communists “completely reckless, arrogant” (quoted in Chang and Di, 1993: 1514). Although neither side could have been interested in escalating the conflict, the crisis came very close to the brink of actual war.…”
Section: China’s Dealing With Disputed Islands: Two Historical Examplesmentioning
confidence: 99%