The 2017 incidents in the Aegean and Turkish foreign policy: using Q-methodology to examine Greek viewpoints

Abstract

In January 2017, relations between Greece and Turkey were under severe strain when warships from both sides engaged in a brief standoff near a pair of uninhabited Greek 'islets' in the Aegean, whose sovereignty is disputed by Turkey. Theoretically informed by the literature of foreign policy analysis, we examine how the Greek diplomats, military officers and political analysts interpreted Turkey's behaviour at that particular time. The article considers the following research question: which factors, from a Greek point of view, explain Turkey's foreign policy in the Aegean in January 2017? Our theoretical expectation is that, in the aftermath of the coup attempt in Turkey, Greek diplomats, military officers and political analysts would ascribe domestic calculations into Turkey's activities. We employed Q-methodology to uncover socially shared perspectives on this topic. Based on our findings, we uncovered two viewpoints: (1) Turkey's diachronic strategy in the Aegean and (2) the strongman style. According to the former and most widely shared viewpoint, a consistent 'rationalist' strategy to change the status quo in the Aegean explains Turkey's behaviour. According to the second one, the belief system of Turkey's leadership legitimises the use of force in the conduct of foreign policy. ARTICLE HISTORY

Diversionary Politics and Territorial Disputes: Evidence from Turkish Airspace Incursions

“…The dispute remains a salient issue for both countries Ifantis 2018) and, by continuation, in their domestic public opinion and the news media. The media has played a particularly active role in the escalation of the 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis (Bayar and Kotelis 2014) while domestic electoral pressures have pushed leaders on both sides to adopt an aggressive foreign policy (Güner 2004;You 2016;Karakasis 2019). Turkish citizens also generally place an emphasis on their country's foreign policy and regional standing while many of them view Greece as a threat and oppose a rapprochement (Aydın 2018:368;Aydın, Çelikpala, Guvenc, Hawks, Zaim, and Tigli 2020:66, 69).…”

“…Particularly the ruling Justice and Develoment Party (AKP) under president Erdoğan has resorted to an increasingly aggressive foreign policy 3 and revisionist rhetoric on the dispute (see e.g. Ifantis 2018;Karakasis 2019). This appears to be motivated in part by the discovery of Gas reserves in the eastern Mediterranean but also domestic pressures as the party is increasingly challenged electorally and had to accept the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) as junior coalition partner to stay in power (Ulgen 2018).…”

Arms Racing, Military Build-Ups and Dispute Intensity: Evidence from the Greek-Turkish Rivalry, 1985-2020

“…The fact that Turkey received more arms transfers within NATO despite its superior military capabilities created more difficulties for Greece and amplified the state of uncertainty in bilateral relations (Krebs 1999:366). Most members of the Greek diplomaticmilitary elite perceive Turkish aggression in the Aegean as the manifestation of a diachronic, rationalist strategy to alter the status quo in the region (Karakasis 2019). The Turkish threat also explains why the end of the Cold War did not result in reductions in the Greek military budget (Antonakis 1997;Kollias 2004).…”

“…Airspace incursions 'violate the sovereignty of that [target] state' and thus allow 'powerful states to project their power and protect their interests at a distance' (Williams 2010:52). As such, consistent Turkish violations of the Greek-claimed airspace gradually diminish Greece's authority over this territory and lend credibility to Turkish claims to shared sovereignty (Ifantis and Triantaphyllou 2018;Karakasis 2019). Airspace violations can thus weaken Greek and strengthen Turkish claims to the contested territory, also signalling Greece's lack of ability or resolve to respond in kind to challenges against its sovereignty.…”