That the Fetus Should be Considered a Legal Person

Boyle, Joseph M.

doi:10.1093/ajj/24.1.59

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Questions That (Mis)guide Us In Understanding What Persons Are1

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Cited by 7 publications

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“…Additionally, the argument that is often given to defend animalismview that we are animals, but not necessarily persons -can be turned against radical versions of the brute physical fact view. According to this argument, it is unintuitive to consider fetuses or unresponsive patients in vegetative state to be persons because they lack relevant psychological features needed for legal capacity (see Boyle 1979;Sherwin 1981;Olson 1997).…”

Section: Questions That (Mis)guide Us In Understanding What Persons Arementioning

confidence: 99%

The notion of a person

Milojević¹

2023

Belgrade Philosop Ann

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The aim of this article is to clarify the content of the concept "person" as it figures in philosophical debates about personhood and personal identity. In order to do so, I will look at both specific philosophical problems that ask for a clear definition of this notion, as well as at the history of this concept's formation, and try to motivate the specific assumptions that are tightly connected to it.

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Section: Questions That (Mis)guide Us In Understanding What Persons Arementioning

confidence: 99%